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LETTERS

Dear Mr. Bieneman:

I read your recent article [“Bridg
ing the Gap Between Data Process
ing and Operating Departments: A
Fresh Approach”] in the Sept.-Oct.
issue of Management Adviser and
want to take a minute to compli
ment you on your fine comments.
Bridging the gap between data pro
cessing and operating departments
has long been a front-line problem
and your approach is very refresh
ing.
I agree with your logic with the
exception of one more difficulty
that I foresee. Assigning the oper
ating managers the responsibility
for developing computer systems
and for determining automation
priorities would lead to the real
necessity of a well controlled steer
ing committee working very close
ly with the EDP manager. If this
January-February, 1973

area broke down, there would be
the horrendous problem of linking
the systems together for sound ac
counting procedures, scheduling
and avoiding duplication of sys
tems work and reporting. I have
found that keeping a good steering
committee functioning is another
problem that merits immediate
help. Ready for another article?
Again, please accept my congrat
ulations and hope you continue to
attack the problems surrounding
our profession.
Sincerely,
Jim Snyder, Manager,
EDP Department
Lowe's Inc.
Cassopolis, Mich.

Dear Mr. Snyder:
Thank you for your recent letter.
I enjoyed your comments and agree
with the point you make.
If we presume that the operating
managers are fulfilling their re
sponsibilities, undoubtedly the de
mand for EDP services will exceed
a company’s ability to provide
those services. Obviously, therefore,
priorities must be established, and
the steering committee which you
mention appears to be the best

vehicle for establishing these priori
ties.
I did, however, have one small
and perhaps subtle disagreement
with the implication of one state
ment you made. You indicated
that there is a problem in keeping
the steering committee functioning.
I don’t dispute for a minute that
this is a problem. In fact, it is the
very problem of management in
volvement which my article ad
dresses. However, can’t this prob
lem be solved by merely pursuing
those EDP systems which operat
ing managers require and are will
ing to become involved with?
Aren’t we right back to the gut
issue of involvement, which will
only come as a result of natural
motivation and proper assignment
of responsibility. If your steering
committee members are not moti
vated to be involved, can you ig
nore them? Can you proceed to
provide computer services to those
operating managers who are inter
ested by assigning top priority to
the projects of those managers, and
ignoring other projects? Can you
not ask the steering committee for
further priority definition when
your load becomes greater than
your staff’s ability to respond?
In short, I heartily agree that
the steering committee is a good
1

“Bridging the Gap”: . . .

idea and has a real purpose. That
purpose is to focus on priorities
and to provide the coordination
of interdepartmental expertise of
which you spoke. But once again,
if the steering committee is dis
interested, it seems to me that
you cannot singlehandedly interest
them except by making the sys
tems development responsibility a
part of the operating manager’s
role and involving the steering
committee only on a referee basis.
I hope that we can discuss these
issues further sometime, as they
deserve more airing than a letter
can often provide. I thank you
very much for your appropriate
comments.
Sincerely,
James N. Bieneman
Crowe, Chizek and Company
South Bend, Ind.

Dear Mr. Bieneman:
Per our discussion, I am docu
menting a description of our oper
ations with respect to utilizing soft
ware people.
The key to the success of the
“Rent-A-Program” concept depends
on successfully dividing the systems
design and systems analysis func
tion between the software people
and the users.
Here in Dayton engineering, we
have a department called engineer
ing software systems that contains
the majority of the engineering
software expertise. Every time we
have a formal planning exercise
(two or three times a year), the
management of the engineering
software group contacts all of the
engineering departments, as well
as my own department, for defini
tion of work requirements for the
coming period.
In turn, the user departments
budget appropriate salary and com
puter dollars to support the esti
mated work. Note that the above
2

budgeting is a combined decision
between the user and the software
managers.
The programing people, who
report on a line basis to the soft
ware management, report on a
functional basis to the user—who
is at liberty to divert funds if he
is not satisfied.
The systems design man receives
user input concerning program
operations and from his peers and
management on technical matters.
Operating procedures, diagnos
tic input and output format, con
trol options, etc., which will be
performed by the user when the
program is finally in production,
are in effect designed by the user.
Whereas file handling techniques,
and other machine-oriented meth
ods, are supplied by the software
people.
I find this particularly effective
in my area where extreme flexi
bility in automated procedures is
essential—I don’t think any ad
ministrative manager can consis
tently second guess higher man
agement in terms of format require
ments or summary structure. I
might add that the programers
have also contributed to produc
tion flexibility by making program
modifications right in the middle
of a production run.
In conclusion, I would have to
say that our operations here sup
port your article, although some
problems exist. The most serious
problem being that the software
manpower planning group may
not be able to satisfy all customers
due to humps in work require
ments. I would appreciate any com
ments or thoughts on the process.
Sincerely,
Thomas B. Hawk, Manager
Data Terminals Engineering
Management Information Systems
The National Cash Register
Company
Dayton, Ohio

Dear Mr. Hawk:

It was a pleasure to receive your
letter and learn of a situation where
the principles I wrote about are
implemented and working. It may
interest you to know that I also
have received feedback from a
number of other sources who indi
cate that, like yourself, they have
successfully assigned systems de
sign responsibility to operating
managers. My impression is that
this approach may be more wide
spread than one might at first ex
pect.
I was pleased to read your com
ment regarding the key to the suc
cess of the NCR approach. You
indicate that success is predicated
upon the successful division of
the technical systems specification
function and the basic systems de
sign and analysis. You assign the
former responsibility to software
personnel and the latter to EDP
users. I could not agree more.
As the years wear on and we
all become more sophisticated in
our computer techniques, I expect
that the division of responsibility
of which you speak to become
more sharply defined. Certain tech
nical expertise will require, even
more than it does today, speciali
zation and dedication in order to
achieve the required proficiency.
By the same token, as computer
using departments mature in their
approach to the utilization of EDP,
I would expect them to demand
more entirely the basic and fun
damental systems design responsi
bility and authority. I expect these
users, having once performed the
systems design function, to never
go back to their former, more pas
sive role. Do you not find your
users wanting to expand the scope
of their involvement? A problem
I foresee is how you will accom
modate this wish.
You indicated a problem due to
humps in work requirements. Of
Management Adviser
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course, this is a problem every
where in varying degrees, and will,
of course, never be eliminated. I
believe, however, that the problem
can be moderated by giving EDP
users as much control over these
humps as possible by making your
division of software development
and user systems design weighted
as heavily toward the user as is
practical. In this way, the user
controls his own destiny and really,
this is as much as you can ask of
the organizational structure.
How does the divided lines of
authority approach work in which
programers report to both software
and EDP personnel?
I particularly liked your approach
to budgeting EDP salary and com
puter expenses, thereby really giv
ing the users control.
As I hope is apparent, I am most
impressed by your company’s pos
itive approach to this area. Thank
you again for your letter and re
sponse to my article.
Very truly yours,
James N. Bieneman

Dear Sir:

The accountants are at it again.
Mr. James N. Bieneman, author of
“Bridging the Gap Between, etc.,”
which appeared in the SeptemberOctober, 1972, issue, is appallingly
out of touch with the real world.
He insults most modern manage
ment people with a type of article
which was quite pertinent in the
early 1960s. You, sir, are an acces
sory to this crime by accepting
such out-of-date pap for publica
tion.
The products of Mr. Bieneman’s
approach are costly fragmentation
and empire building. I can only as
sume that he relates to small com
panies, or he may be shooting at
“Ma Bell.”
In any event, his article does
January-February, 1973

your fine magazine an injustice. It
is suggested that you employ the
services of an assistant editor who
is in touch with the real world. If
your publication is to include arti
cles relative to EDP, I believe it
is in order to set your sights much
higher to obtain professional rele
vancy.
Yours truly,
George E. Ott,* Manager
Information Systems Department
Owens-Illinois
Toledo, Ohio
*Qualifications: 1. Sixteen years in indus
trial accounting, operations research, and
financial analysis. 2. Fourteen years in
EDP management including all functions.
3. Member and officer, present and past,
in several accounting, management, and
EDP professional organizations.

Dear Mr. Ott:
I regret that my article dis
pleased you so.
Are you claiming that the “gap”
I describe between operating man
agers and EDP professionals is not
really there? Do you acknowledge
the gap but doubt that my sugges
tion for bridging it will work?
With respect to the reality of the
schism between operating man
agers and EDP and the related
frustration felt by many operating
people, I can only say that OwensIllinois is to be congratulated if
you do not have this problem. I
venture that if you have really
solved it, you have in fact placed
the systems responsibility with op
erating managers, perhaps under
another name.
On your other comment, that my
approach would result in costly
fragmentation and empire building,
I must respectfully but heartily
disagree. Fragmentation is only
costly if it results in duplication of
effort. Placing systems responsibility
with operating managers isn’t dup
licate effort. It very intentionally

does shift the performance of cer
tain tasks, and the ultimate systems
responsibility. Why must this be
more costly?
Do you not agree that data pro
cessing professionals are not also
experts in the fields of marketing,
production and inventory control,
and accounting? What you call
fragmentation I call placement of
responsibility with the profession
best qualified to handle it. If there
is a problem of empire building,
my own experience is that data
processing departments are more
often the guilty parties, particularly
when they presume competency for
systems design in all other disci
plines.
I suspect that our differences are
not really so great as your letter
and my response might at first sug
gest. You are probably concerned
about how the concept I propose
could and would be implemented.
So am I. You are undoubtedly con
cerned about how and if operating
managers would achieve the mini
mum data processing familiarity
and expertise required for my pro
posal to work and, again, so am I.
The issue remains: how do we
achieve the line management in
volvement that is required for our
computer systems to be effective? I
say let’s concentrate on finding
ways to support the “bridge” of
systems responsibility placed with
operating management. Although
not easily built, it is a bridge which
can be supported, and which offers
real and compelling reasons for
operating management to. fulfill
their EDP involvement responsi
bilities.
Parenthetically, I would close by
noting that a large number of com
panies, including some very large
concerns, are successfully operating
under the environment proposed in
my article.
Very truly yours,
James N. Bieneman
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Michael C. Luecke • Computer Models: ‘Black Box’ or Management-Oriented? ...............

p. 17

In growing numbers companies are developing com
puter models. However, many are left on the shelf
because of their “black box” image in management’s
mind. Mr. Luecke says the blame for these premature

deaths can be shared by both model builders and
management. He presents some guidelines for devel
oping a successful model and illustrates them with
CIBA-GEIGY’s capital investment simulation model.

Robert N. Williamson • Uncertainty in Present

due Calculations........................................ p. 25

The use of single-valued estimates (the means), in
place of probability distributions, when calculating
discounted cash flow imparts a false sense of accuracy

and in most cases leads to biased estimates of the net
present value of proposed investment projects, the
author says.

John F. Beckmann • ‘Managing’ BOI on Business Contracts—Through Simulation
This article discusses how a relatively simple com
puter planning model, developed by a Government
contractor, can assist top management in delegating
responsibility for return-on-investment management

............. p. 28

by applying ROI criteria to daily financial decision
making. The approach described is applicable to most
businesses involved in fulfilling manufacturing or ser
vice contracts, Mr. Beckmann believes.

Carl H. Poedtke, Jr. • Work Measurement Alone Is Not the Answer...................................... p. 39
Work measurement without the support of other tech
niques is not really a potent tool for improving either
the effectiveness or productivity of clerical operations,

Mr. Poedtke says. For lasting improvements, a pro
gram which also includes supervisory training and
systems analysis is necessary.

C. W. Lee • Accounting Myopia....................

......................................................................... p. 43

To remain an important adviser to management, the
accountant must shift his main emphasis from internal
events to external ones, from the past to the future,

and from tangible to intangible concepts and values,
Mr. Lee believes. He urges more realistic trade-offs
between relevance and precision.
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Robert I. Stevens • Policies and Procedures: Getting Out the Word........................................
Despite the size of its staff, 400,000 employees, ITT
has made the procedural aspects of its internal com
munications job fairly routine through the use of prop

p. 49

erly developed basic systems management concepts.
Smaller organizations could use simplified versions
of its policy guides and lexicon.

Recognition of EDP Operational Problems...................................................................................... p. 55
Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery has developed this
checklist to aid business management in spotting op

erational difficulties in its EDP systems. Use of the
grid requires careful fact-finding and evaluation.
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Homer
Toulouse-Lautrec
John Milton
Charles Proteus Steinmetz
Ray Charles
Alexander Pope
Beethoven
Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Helen Keller
George Shearing

You’ve just read ten good reasons to hire the handicapped.

THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF THE HANDICAPPED, WASHINGTON, D. C. 20210
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Large and Small Companies Must Operate by Different Methods
Say Cohn and Lindberg in Briefing Published by AMA
Businesses that are very different
in size must conduct their affairs
in very different ways, maintain
two CPAs in a recent surveybacked briefing published by the
American Management Association.
Theodore Cohn and Roy Lind
berg, both of J. H. Cohn & Com
pany, Newark, N.J., are the au
thors of “How Management Is Dif
ferent in Small Companies.” It is
available at $5.00 a copy to AMA
members and $7.50 a copy to others.
The CPAs state, “Business ad
ministration is primarily a descrip
tion of the methods that have
worked in large concerns and has
been remarkably neglectful of the
January-February, 1973

needs and ways of small compa
nies. For these reasons the authors
believe that the present body of
commonly accepted management
knowledge does not sufficiently
recognize the uniqueness of the
small firm.”
Company presidents surveyed

In part, the study is based on a
mailed questionnaire that was an
swered by 106 small company pres
idents (companies having annual
sales from $2 million to $10 mil
lion) and 91 large company presi
dents (companies with annual sales
from $80 million to $600 million).

The authors were able to draw
many conclusions from their work.
Some of these are:
“Where the small businessman
does consciously attend to adminis
tration, he tends to adopt the meth
ods and practices used in larger
firms rather than to develop tech
niques and applications that are
more specific to his needs.
“This form of imitation usually
brings about operating and proce
dural inefficiencies. Techniques cop
ied from large firms are, in small
companies, more often brought in
as unrelated bits of administrative
magic than as part of an integrated
process.”
7

Two-thirds of the questionnaire’s
respondents said that management
is more difficult in large than in
small companies. The authors point
out this reply could be expected
from large company managers, but
55 per cent of the small company
managers who responded to the
questionnaire also felt this way.
Most of the small company man
agers believed their firms’ man
agement problems stemmed from
the limited number of management
personnel. The big company man
agers said their management prob
lems were a result of the large size
of the group of people to be man
aged.
Based on the survey and their
experience, Messrs. Cohn and Lind
berg advise, “Small companies
should strive to excel in short-term
planning. Detailed planning be
yond the clearly seen future can
induce rigidities that may largely
offset or destroy the advantages of
a small firm’s innate flexibility and
maneuverability.
“The smaller quantities of goods
produced, fewer salesmen, lower
inventory levels, smaller outlays for
advertising and promotion, and
similar characteristics of small bus
inesses seldom justify the risks or
costs imposed by long-range plans.”
The two CPAs suggest that small
companies can broaden the basis of
their key decision making by form
ing a carefully chosen and authori
tative board of directors or man
agement committee with at least
40 per cent outside membership
(nonequity).
“Such a group can place a wider
variety of skills, experience, and
sensitivities at the service of a small
firm than normally can be found
within it,” the authors explain.
“Small business managers tend to
miss the experience that helps them
grow into broad-gauged decision
makers. A properly constituted
group, such as an advisory com
mittee, having at least two non
company but business-oriented
members, offsets that lack.”
The 48-page Cohn and Lindberg
briefing is available from the AMA,
135 West 50th St., New York, N.Y.
10020.
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‘Typical Corporate President,' Midwesterner Educated in

East, Works 50-Hour Week, Earns $100,000 a Year
The typical corporate president,
according to a Heidrick and Strug
gles survey, is a 53-year-old midwesterner who received his bac
calaureate from a private Eastern
school, his graduate degree from an
Ivy League school, and earns cash
compensation of $100,000 or more
for a year of 50+ hours workweeks.
Heidrick and Struggles, Inc., a
management consulting and execu
tive search firm, questioned the
presidents of the 500 largest indus
trial companies and the 50 largest
merchandising, transportation, life
insurance, financial, and utility or
ganizations as ranked by FOR
TUNE. Of this group 64.2 per cent
responded. The firm conducts this
survey every five years.
Youth, greater education noted

The trend detected by the firm
is, “Today’s president, equipped by
education and background of busi
ness experience to meet and mas
ter unprecedented challenge, is
younger, assumed his position earl
ier after receiving more extensive
schooling, and is more richly re
warded than his predecessors of
even five years ago.”
The firm also noted that fewer
presidents of major organizations
are holding outside board direc
torships.
More than one in five of the ex
ecutives surveyed holds none and
another fifth of the respondents
only hold one.
Heidrick and Struggles suggests
that some of the most common rea
sons for this nonparticipation “are
the growing size and complexity of
the presidents’ own businesses, the
pressures for broader representa
tion on corporate boards, the grow
ing possibility of suits directed
against boards of directors, and the
tightening of anti-trust laws.”
The survey found that the most
common (38.1 per cent) under
graduate major of presidents with
college degrees was engineering

and science. Business was chosen
by 23.1 per cent. On the graduate
level 41.0 per cent of the 37.7 per
cent with graduate degrees held
them in law and 30.9 per cent held
an M.B.A., which H&S says is an
impressive gain for the M.B.A. over
the five-year period between sur
veys.

Range of specialties

According to the study, 27.6 per
cent of all the company presidents
responding to the questions had
their most extensive experience in
general administration, 23.3 per
cent in marketing, and 17.1 per cent
in finance.
Over the last five years, the con
sulting firms says “marketing has
made strong inroads as background
for industrial company presidents.”
This agrees with the trend noted
by Golightly & Co. (see M/A,
Nov.-Dec., ’72, p. 7).

Range of tenure

H&S said that presidents of major
organizations “are most frequently
found with either very short or very
long tenure with their present em
ployer.”
Of all the responding company
presidents, 18.4 per cent said they
had been with their organizations
five years or fewer, 24.4 per cent
31 years and more.

Increase in mobility

The consulting firm says that
these figures show an increase in
mobility because five years ago
only 12.2 per cent of the presidents
had been with their companies for
such a short period of time and 30.8
per cent had been at the same
company for 31 years or more.
For the first time, two women
were included in the Heidrick and
Struggles survey of company presi
dents.
Management Adviser

Executive Job Seekers
COMPARISON OF BASE SALARY AND FRINGES
U.S. vs. SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Back at Prerecession
Country

Base
Salary
(Mid-Point)*

U.S.
Austria
France
Germany
Italy
Spain
U.K.

$19,700
15,000
15,600
16,100
15,200
17,700
11,300

Level, Handy Reports
The third quarter of 1972 saw the
number of executives on the job
market return to the prerecession
level of the same quarter of 1968,
a survey conducted by Handy As
sociates, an executive search firm,
reports.
This was a 21 per cent drop in ex
ecutive job seekers from 1972’s sec
ond quarter; however, Handy sta
tisticians point out there was a sig
nificant upturn in the number of
job seekers in June. This fluke in
what the firm otherwise sees as a
downward trend was studied but
no strong conclusions about it were
reached.

+

Companypaid
Fringes

=

$2,400
3,700
4,800
3,400
6,100
2,900
4,100

Total

$22,100
18,700
20,400
19,500
21,300
20,600
15,400

*Includes cash and cash extras, such as 13th month pay, and standard
benefits such as vacations and holidays.

Reprinted with permission from Men & Management, Number 251, a publication of
Hay Associates, Philadelphia.

Foreign Nationals in Growing Demand as Managers
For U.S. Companies; Income Rising Accordingly

Executive unrest eased

Handy notes that since 1969 the
number of job-seeking executives
has been climbing, but the firm
now believes the number has re
turned to a more normal level. The
third quarter of 1972 level matches
the third quarter 1971 level, a
Handy spokesman said.
“While there has been some fluc
tuations in executive unrest in
1972, the overall trend has been
downward,” said Handy Vice Pres
ident James R. Clovis.
“In the second quarter some ex
ecutives were encouraged by an
improvement in the economy and
jumped into the job market to seek
new opportunities. They appear to
have been quickly absorbed by the
marketplace and overall executive
mobility and demand has flattened
out to the 1968 level,” he said.
Marketing executives represented
the largest decline in executive job
hunters. In the second quarter they
composed 35 per cent of the seek
ers, but in the third quarter they
were only 27 per cent. Coupling
this fact with the overall decrease
in the number of executive job seek
ers, the number of marketing ex
ecutives seeking new jobs dropped
23 per cent between quarters.
January-February, 1973

For political and other reasons,
foreign nationals have become more
and more desirable as managers of
overseas branches of U.S. compa
nies, observes Hay Associates, Phil
adelphia, management consultants.
In a recent issue of its newslet
ter, Men & Management, the firm
says that the small number of for
eign nationals possessing Americanstyle management techniques and
prevailing inflationary pressures
abroad have combined to force “a
dramatic rise in compensation” of
foreign managers.
Similar jobs rated

The accompanying chart, shown
above, was developed by the firm
for jobs carrying a weight of ap
proximately 325 “Hay points (which
are awarded on the basis of know
how, problem-solving ability, and
accountability that the job re
quires).” The chart shows that
while U.S. managers may receive
the highest median base salary,
they receive the lowest amount of
company-paid fringe benefits.
Although an Italian manager may
receive $4,500 less than his U.S.
counterpart in salary, he receives
$3,700 more in benefits. The Italian
is actually receiving only $800 less

than the American and differences
in living costs may make the Ital
ian’s compensation worth more than
that of a U.S. counterpart earning
the same amount.
Two major questions

In establishing global compensa
tion practices, management must
address itself to two major ques
tions, Hay believes:
“1—What is the employee abroad
actually being paid?”
“2—Then, what is the employee’s
real take-home pay, considered in
the light of taxes, statutory benefits
and purchasing power?”
Some variables that must be
taken into account in this evalua
tion are: standards of living; tax
structures; national characteristics;
and social insurance philosophies.
“If you’re paying too much,
you’re wasting dollars and setting
ill-advised precedents. If you’re
paying too little, you’re not going
to keep your people, and it’s diffi
cult to run a business without peo
ple,” Hay says.
The complete text of this issue of
Men & Management, Number 251,
is available from Hay Associates,
1845 Walnut Street, Philadelphia,
Pa. 19103.
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American Can Company's new headquarters in Greenwich, Conn.

Though Trek to Suburbs Continues, Most New York City
Companies Still Say ‘Make Mine Manhattan’
Although nearly all of the com
panies headquartered in New York
City have contemplated moving to
the suburbs, most have decided to
stay, The Conference Board points
out in a recent study, “Corporate
Moves to the Suburbs: Problems
and Opportunities,” by J. Roger
O’Meara. However, since 1967
there has been a noticeable increase
in the number of companies leav
ing Manhattan.
The Conference Board obtained
confidential information from more
than 80 companies. Twenty-nine
are settled in the suburbs around
New York City, 10 decided to move
to the suburbs but to keep head
quarters in the city, 12 relocated
outside of the metropolitan area,
and 33 companies considered mov
ing out but decided against it.
Some of the reasons given for
leaving the city were: to gain ex
pansion room; to locate operations
where key personnel live; to es
cape city problems; and to improve
productivity by removing employ
ees from city distractions.
The companies that have stayed
in the city told The Conference
Board that they had to stay “where
the action is.” Some of the other
reasons given for staying were: it
10

would cost too much to leave; many
problems that plague the city have
spread to the suburbs; and subur
ban moves bring new problems
such as property management and
development of employee services
(including transportation, parking,
and recreation).
Fear of losing employees

While the fear of losing good
employees is one reason many cor
porations stay in New York, Amer
ican Can lost only about 100 of
its 1,300 employees when it moved
from New York City to Green
wich, Conn. Mr. O’Meara explains,
“It has been noted that not all
employees take kindly to working
in the country. The number of
these that do, however—particularly
where they are allowed adequate
relocation assistance or can com
mute with reasonable expedience
from where they have been resid
ing to the new company locationcan be quite large.”
The most important consideration
related to a suburban move is to
keep employees informed of all
developments that affect them,
many of the executives who were
interviewed by The Conference

Board said. One company official
commented, “We found that people
made up all sorts of reasons for
the move (most of them diabolic)
when we were not ‘Johnny-on-thespot.’ ”
According to the executives ques
tioned, the initial announcement of
the move to the employees should
include: “1—Where the company
will move and how far the new
site is from the present location;
2—The expected date of the move;
3—Why the company is moving
(an on-the-level explanation); 4—
What general financial and other
assistance the company plans to
give both the employees who will
move with their jobs and the em
ployees who will not; 5—The prom
ise of more detailed information in
the near future.” The Conference
Board report includes a sample
letter of intent to move and a sam
ple employee newsletter.
The Conference Board points
out that pressures from civil rights
groups are being applied to com
panies that have announced plans
to move to the suburbs. These
groups charge that such moves are
discriminatory since most minority
group workers are unable to pay
the relocation expenses that must
be incurred to retain their jobs.
“Corporate Moves to the Sub
urbs: Problems and Opportunities,”
is available from The Conference
Board, 845 Third Avenue, New
York, N.Y. 10022. It is priced at
$1.00 for associates and educators,
and $5.00 for all others.

Exaggerating Pollution

Handicaps Solutions

Says Metal Executive
Exaggerated environmental
standards can short-change other
social goals, warned R. S. Reynolds,
Jr., chairman of the board and
president of Reynolds Metals Com
pany.
“The price of the environmental
overkill may prove too heavy a
price, reducing the living standards
of our people and preempting a
Management Adviser

good deal of national income that
might be better spent on other so
cial needs,” Mr. Reynolds told the
annual meeting of the Tennessee
River Valley Association.
He said that well-publicized neg
atives have led to unreasonable air
and water quality standards and
arbitrary deadlines for compliance.
Costly crash programs, instead of
orderly attention to specific pollu
tion problems, have resulted from
hurried political response to the
crisis atmosphere that has been
created.
Mr. Reynolds maintains the aver
age citizen is unaware of the en
vironmental achievements made by
industry and government. He men
tioned: improved treatment of
waste water by municipal authori
ties and industry; a 96 per cent
increase in anti-pollution hardware
produced by industry in the last
two years; 1,150 patents for pollu
tion-related devices filed in the
last two years; and an increase in
the number of recycling programs.
“The environmental revolution is
in full swing. The most advanced
industrial society in the world al
most overnight is changing its
methods of operation, equipment,
and criteria for plant location,” Mr.
Reynolds said.
The aluminum executive called
for a balance in environmental
thinking.
“Every unnecessary dollar spent
on meeting exaggerated environ
mental goals—goals not needed for

the public safety, health or wel
fare—is a dollar not available for
the other social goods our society
is saying it wants and needs,” he
said.

Regulatory Agencies
Exceed Powers, Says
DeButts of AT&T
Businessmen were urged to speak
out and help set new societal pri
orities, or risk being cast as the vil
lains of the piece, by AT&T Chair
man John D. deButts speaking be
fore the Economic Club of New
York on November 14.
Mr. deButts contends that regu
latory decisions are being made “in
the public interest” without the
public understanding what these
regulatory agencies are all about.
“Today regulatory agencies com
prise a ‘fourth branch of govern
ment’—one that wields vast influ
ence over most of American in
dustry and a wide range of vital
public concerns,” Mr. deButts
said. “And yet—for most Americans
—the functions of these agencies—
are a mystery wrapped in an
enigma.”
Because regulatory proceedings
tend to span a long period of time,
the press neglects to report on
them, the AT&T chairman stated.
Consequently, decisions are made
in the public interest “without the
benefit of that useful discipline that
would be brought to bear were

there in fact a public’ to raise the
question, ‘Is it ... is it really?’ ”
Mr. deButts questioned if the pub
lic would support demands being
made on pulp and paper mills that
they equip themselves to remove
99.5 per cent of the dust they pro
duce, as against 97 per cent, “when
removing that last two and a half
per cent calls for twice as much
power and costs the consumer 35
per cent more?”
He also asked, “Is it really in the
public interest to put so low a ceil
ing on the price of a vital fuel that
the incentive to supply it disap
pears—and so does the fuel?”
Businessmen are familiar with the
necessity of making hard choices,
balancing opportunities against re
sources available, Mr. deButts
said, and consequently can con
tribute to society’s search for its ap
propriate goals.
“In brief, what trade-offs—of pri
vate convenience for public good,
of present consumption for future
use, of higher costs for uncertain
social benefits—is the public—or
rather the people who comprise it—
actually ready to make when the
oratory dies down and the final vote
is taken?
“It is on our readiness to address
ourselves to the facts behind these
hard questions—and not on sim
plistic assertions of the virtues of
enterprise—that such claim as busi
ness has to a place of leadership in
our society will in the final analysis
depend,” the AT&T executive said.

For the Management Consultant—

Experts Disagree on Whether Software is Tangible Property
At AMA Conference; State Tax Rules Said to Vary Widely
Is software tangible? At a recent
AMA briefing session one speaker
said from a technical point of view
the question cannot apply to soft
ware, while another said from a
legal standpoint it has to.
A “Computer Software Protection
and Taxation” meeting was held
November 8 at AMA headquarters
in New York. Its two speakers were
Lawrence A. Welke, president of
January-February, 1973

International Computer Programs,
Inc., Indianapolis, and Roy N.
Freed, partner in the legal firm of
Widett & Widett, Boston.
Software definition lacking

Mr. Welke maintains that every
one is avoiding the question of
exactly what software is and warns
that if a definition is not arrived at

by private citizens the tax asses
sors may set up standards every
one will find hard to live with.
“To the extent that we don’t
bother them, sooner or later we’ll
get hurt,” the software executive
said.
“It doesn’t make any difference
if software is or is not ‘tangible.’
Applying cubbyholes from every
where else to software just doesn’t
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work,” Mr. Welke made clear.
“We should be asking is soft
ware a product or a service? How
do we assess software? How do we
place a valuation on it?”
In an attempt to find out how
various states are handling soft
ware taxation, Mr. Welke wrote
and called the state authorities in
volved. In five states, no sales and
no use tax are applied to software,
he found. In 26 states, sales tax and
use tax are applied. Three states’
tax agencies asked what “software”
is and the other states did not re
spond to Mr. Welke’s questions.
Four states view software as
property, Mr. Welke said. These
are California, Kansas, Washing
ton, and Michigan. A recent Cali
fornia court ruling has classified all
basic operating systems software
“resident in the state” property and
taxable for 1972 and 1973, he told
the AMA group.
Mr. Welke criticized the AICPA
for not taking a stand on how soft
ware taxation should be handled.
“The viewpoint of the AICPA is
that they don’t have one,” he said.
“What will it take to force the
AICPA to face the problem ... I
don’t know if there is anyone there
who cares.”
“Cubbyholes” called necessary

Roy Freed addressed the ques
tion of how to protect a computer
program and he said for legal pur
poses the “cubbyholes from every
where else” that Mr. Welke had
referred to were necessary.
He outlined six types of legal
protection available: copyrighting;
enforcing trade secrets rights; pat
enting; licensing; securing written
nondisclosure agreements from cus
tomers; and leasing of materials in
the software package.
The first line of defense for pro
gram protection is technical, Mr.
Freed advised. Some technical
measures are distribution of only
the object code of a program or
distribution of the program only on
a time-sharing basis. The legal
approach to program protection is
the third or fourth line of defense,
the attorney explained.
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“If you have a program you
don’t want people to use, then
keep it in the usual [trade] secret
way . . . Publish about it so no
one else can patent it . . . Put a
common law copyright notice on
written material,” were some of
Mr. Freed’s suggestions.
Protection under common law

He said he believes that com
mon law is the area which will
afford software the most protec
tion. This will come in the area of
misappropriation, i.e., someone is
misappropriating your product.
There are some practical con
siderations, besides legal ones, that
keep computer programs from be
ing pirated. Programs need main
tenance and enhancement and pir
ated programs do not come with
these services, Mr. Freed pointed
out.

these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are
raised which only committees of
Congress can manage, for broad
powers of investigation are needed,
including hearings which canvass
the wide variety of views which
those operating in this field enter
tain. The technological problems
tendered in the many briefs before
us indicate to us that considered
action by Congress is needed.”
Congressional battle predicted

The Business Equipment Manu
facturers Association had argued
against the patentability of pro
grams. However, patent lawyers
believe that the software houses
and large computer users with sub
stantial investments in software will
have the question brought to Con
gress soon.

IBM’s ‘Virtual Storage’
Supreme Court Rules

Will Benefit Four User

EDP Programs Are

Types: Auerbach

Unpatentable ‘Ideas’
The Supreme Court ruled on No
vember 20 that computer programs
are basically ideas that cannot be
patented.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote
in the Court’s six-to-zero opinion,
“It is conceded that one may not
patent an idea. But in practical ef
fect that would be the result if the
formula were patented in this case.”
The test case brought before the
Court was that of Gary R. Benson
and Arthur C. Tabbot of Bell Tel
ephone Laboratories, Inc. They
had developed a nine-step program
that converted one number system
to another. The two men had as
signed their patent claims to Bell
Labs.
Copyright protection is available
for computer programs, but soft
ware interests seem to want the
stronger protection a patent can af
ford. While a copyright protects
against plagiarism, a patent would
prevent anyone from using the item
whether it was copied or not.
Justice Douglas concluded, “If

Four categories of computer us
ers can immediately benefit from
virtual storage on the IBM System/
370, a recent edition of the Auer
bach Standard EDP Reports ex
plains.
Virtual storage, according to
Auerbach, “amounts to using high
speed discs and drums to provide
inexpensive (but slower) expan
sions to main processor storage.
Such expansions in the past have
been—and can still be—obtained by
using core storage, which is faster
but far more expensive.”
Old concept new for IBM

The concept has been around
since the late 1950s, the report
notes, and was used by Burroughs
and RCA in the 1960s, but it has
only recently been incorporated in
IBM’s product line (see M/A Sept.Oct, ’72, p. 13).
Auerbach believes the four groups
of computer users that will find
virtual storage on System/370 im
mediately beneficial are users who:
Management Adviser

“• Are burdened by programing
personnel costs.
“• Are experiencing scheduling
problems due to memory fragmen
tation.
“• Find the costs of real storage
previously necessary to implement
on-line (communications and real
time) systems prohibitive.
“• Greatly desire system backup
assurance.”
A 24-page report on “IBM System/370 Advanced Function (Vir
tual Memory)” is available for $25
from AUERBACH Publishers, 121
North Broad Street, Philadelphia,
Pa. 19107.

JONES CORPORATION
SOCIO-ECONOMIC OPERATING STATEMENT
for the Year Ended December 31, 1971
1 RELATIONS WITH PEOPLE:
A. Improvements:
1. Training program for handicapped
workers

$ 10,000

2. Contribution to black college

4,000

3. Extra turnover costs because of
minority hiring program

5,000

4. Cost of nursery school for children
of employees, voluntarily set up

11,000

Total Improvements

$ 30,000

B. Less: Detriments
1. Postponed installing new safety
devices on cutting machines
(cost of the devices)

14,000

C. Net Improvements in People
Actions for the Year

$ 16,000

II RELATIONS WITH ENVIRONMENT:
A. Improvements:
1. Cost of reclaiming and landscaping
old dump on company property

$ 70,000

Linowes Says Tax,

2. Cost of installing pollution control
devices on Plant A smokestacks

4,000

Reporting Reforms Are

3. Cost of detoxifying waste from
finishing process this year

9,000

Key to Social Goals
The key to corporate concern
for the environment is not new
legal prohibitions but new report
ing and tax structures, David F.
Linowes, CPA, told the 1972 En
vironmental Health Conference.
Mr. Linowes, a partner in the
New York office of Laventhol Krek
stein Horwath & Horwath, and a
well known proponent of socio
economic accounting (see M/A
Nov.-Dec., ’71, p. 23), believes the
“power of visibility” can force
businesses to behave responsibly.
“Let the consumer, the share
holder, the voter see the voluntary
social actions and non-actions of
a business enterprise as clearly as
he now examines the profits and
losses of a company, and we will
witness a major thrust of the exec
utive suite into cleaning up. Couple
this visibility with a tax benefit,
and we would have created the
kind of motivation business exec
utives understand and respond to
with alacrity,” Mr. Linowes told
the Environmental Health Con
ference.
Just as businesses issue periodic
profit and loss statements, Mr. Lin
owes proposes a Socio-Economic
Operating Statement be issued.
January-February, 1973

$ 83,000

Total Improvements

B. Less: Detriments
1. Cost that would have been incurred
to re-landscape strip mining site
used this year

$ 80,000

2. Estimated cost to have installed
purification process to neutralize
poisonous liquid being dumped
into stream

100,000

180,000

C. Net Deficit in Environment
Actions for the Year

($ 97,000)

III RELATIONS WITH PRODUCT:
A. Improvements:
1. Salary of V.P. while serving on
government Product Safety
Commission

2. Cost of substituting lead-free paint
for previously used poisonous lead paint
Total Improvements

$ 25,000
9,000
$ 34,000

B. Less: Detriments

1. Safety device recommended by
Safety Council but not added
to product

22,000

C. Net Improvements in Product
Actions for the Year

$ 12,000

Total Socio-Economic Deficit for
the Year

($ 69,000)

Add: Net Cumulative Socio-Economic
Improvements as at January 1, 1971

$249,000

Grand Total Net Socio-Economic
Actions to December 31, 1971

$180,000

Reprinted with permission from LKHH Accountant, Vol. 52, No. 3, a publica
tion of Laventhol Krekstein Horwath & Horwath.

Expenditures the organization has
voluntarily made to benefit em
ployees and/or the public would
be credited.
These would be offset by the

estimated costs of any measures
management has not taken though
it had been made aware of the
need for them to benefit employ
ees and/or the public.
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The SEOS would be prepared
by an interdisciplinary team pos
sessing the specific expertise neces
sary for the particular industry.
An outside interdisciplinary team,
headed by a CPA, would audit the
internally prepared SEOS, Mr.
Linowes explained.
These social action debits and
credits could be classified in three
categories: “Relations with Peo
ple,” “Relations with the Environ
ment,” and “Relations with the
Product,” he said.
Required within 20 years

“It is almost certain that the
SEOS, or its equivalent, whether
it is called a ‘social audit,’ or
something else, will be required
within the next 20 years for most
business organizations,” Mr. Lin
owes predicted.
Though the “power of visibility”
might be strong, Mr. Linowes also
suggests a tax deduction would
help stir the conscience of business.
“Congress should enact legisla
tion allowing companies a deduc
tion against taxable income for net
social expenditures shown on the
SEOS for the year which exceed
a certain percentage of the taxpay
er’s net worth.
“It might be recommended that
such net socio-economic expendi
tures which exceed 1 per cent of
the net worth of a company be
allowed as a full deduction from
taxable income. This would be in
addition to all other expense and
depreciation allowances already
made for these same items,” Mr.
Linowes said.

Nader Group Attacks
Government Use

Of Consultants
Ralph Nader’s Center for Study
of Responsive Law has recom
mended that a system of perform
ance measures for Government con
tractors, especially consultants, be
worked out.
This recommendation and others
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were presented in October by
Nader Raiders Daniel Guttman and
Barry Willner at House Post Office
and Civil Service Committee hear
ings on the use of private consult
ants.
The Raiders used a major ac
counting firm as an example of
a Government consultant whose
past contract performance is “wor
thy of individual scrutiny.”
The speakers told the House
committee that three questions
about Government contracts must
be answered: “1. How is the merit
of the professional service contrac
tor evaluated? 2. The Civil Service
System has an elaborate set of con
flict of interest rules. What conflict
of interest rules govern contracts?
3. Where should Government draw
the line as to the functions that
should be delegated to private con
tractors, and who should draw the
line?”
Control revival urged

The resurrection of Bureau of the
Budget circular A-49 was urged by
Messrs. Guttman and Willner. The
circular was issued in 1959 to gov
ern management and operating
contracts. It asks the agencies to
evaluate the work of consultants
and to define when their work is
appropriate. After 1962 A-49
“washes out in the files,” the Raid
ers were told by an employee of
the Office of Management and the
Budget.
If A-49 is not revived, they sug
gested the Civil Service Commis
sion should oversee such questions
as length of consultant services and
delegation of authority.
They also suggested to the House
Committee that the conflict of in
terest laws be altered to bring con
tractors within the standards set
for Civil Service employees.

Space problems have made it
impossible to incorporate our
feature “New Products and
Services” this month. It will
be published in our next issue.

EDP Bill of Material
System Forecasts,
Produces 22 Reports
A computerized bill of material
system which forecasts require
ments and produces 22 reports, in
cluding variations, is being imple
mented at C. P. Clare & Co., Chi
cago.
C. P. Clare is a manufacturer
of relays and electromechanical
switches. The company has nine
product lines and processes 500600 orders a week. Fifty per cent
of these are custom orders that re
quire new bills of material.
“The new bill of material system
is designed to achieve the goal of
improved customer service by mak
ing it possible to more accurately
forecast requirements,” said C. P.
Clare’s data processing manager,
Richard J. Bergman. “Forecasting
requirements through a bill of ma
terial explosion is more accurate
than relying solely on past usage to
determine requirements.”
The new bill of material system,
developed by NCR, has a “Same
as Except” capability for new bills
that are the same as old ones with
only minor variations. The new bill
can be entered with only two or
three lines of data instead of 40 or
50 lines, says Mr. Bergman.
Clare’s bill of material system
can also accept labor operations as
if they are raw material or parts.
Mr. Bergman explained, “Provid
ing a single file for both labor and
material, the system enables us to
more accurately and efficiently de
termine finished product labor and
material costs and better control
these costs. In addition, we have
the ability to produce routing
sheets showing labor and material
required for each operation se
quence and to cost out work-inprocess inventory.”
The company is using the system
for: engineering bills of material
and where use listings; costed bills
of material; cost of sales analyses;
routing sheets of operations; lists
for preparing kits of materials; and
new order editing.
Management Adviser

For the Executive in Finance—

Ackley Attacks Wage-Price Controls, Proposes Another

Anti-Inflation Measure at Conference in Newark
Direct wage and price controls
are a drastic and dangerous weap
on, maintains Gardner Ackley. In
their place he proposes a system
of basically voluntary guidelines,
which he explained at the J. H.
Cohn & Company, CPAs, annual
conference, October 18 in New
ark, N. J.
Dr. Ackley holds the Henry
Carter Adams University Profes
sorship of Political Economy at the
University of Michigan. He served
on the President’s Council of Eco
nomic Advisers from 1962 to 1968
and was U.S. ambassador to Italy
from March, 1968, to September,
1969. During the recent campaign
he was chairman of the Economic
Affairs Committee of the Demo
cratic Policy Council.
Six-point system

He explained to the CPA firm’s
clients that his anti-inflation sys
tem was designed to deal with the
long-range tendencies toward in
flation in a high employment econ
omy. Dr. Ackley summarized the
system in six points:
“1. It would be limited in its
coverage to collectively bargained
wages and fringe benefits, to prices
of a few strategic materials re
gardless of seller, and to all prices
charged by the 1,500 to 2,000 larg
est corporations, except that retail
prices, rents, prices of personal
services, and farm prices would in
no case be included.
“2. The system would be admin
istered by a Government agency,
created by legislation, and possess
ing certain legal authority . . .”
“3. The system would, however,
derive most of its effective legi
timacy through the active partici
pation of representatives of labor,
of management, of other interest
groups, and of the public in fram
ing both of its standards for equi
table and noninflationary wage and
January-February, 1973

price changes and its operating
procedures—but not in their ad
ministration.
“4. These standards for wage
and price changes would be wide
ly publicized and explained, and
adherence to them promoted by
all unions, employers, and firms.
“5. The substantial full-time
Government staff administering the
program would have broad author
ity to intervene publicly, privately,
or both, in the determination of
those wages and prices subject to
the restraint system.
“It would have legal authority to
require, to the extent necessary,
advance notice of important wage
and price changes; it could re
quire delay in putting such changes
into effect for a reasonable period
while it studied their appropriate
ness; and it could require the sub
mission of all relevant information.
“Based on its study, it would
have the authority to recommend
those specific wage or price changes
which it deemed consistent with
its standards either privately to the
parties and/or publicly to the
country. But it would not have the
authority to impose its recommen
dations on the parties!
“6. However, there would be a
reserve legal authority, given to a
special court, to enjoin any firm
or employer for a period of, say,
one year, from charging specific
prices or paying specific wages or
benefits which the wage-price
agency could show would be gross
ly inconsistent with its standards.”
Dr. Ackley believes sometime
within the next year the present
controls should be supplanted by
a voluntary system similar to the
one he described.
Sooner or later a system of pub
lic intervention in private wage
and price setting is going to be
established, Dr. Ackley said. Its
success will depend on the consent
of the power centers in business

and labor, he told the group.
“It is my belief that the essential
basis for this consent exists today
in the recognition by both big la
bor and big business that they
have certain responsibilities to the
larger society, and that the unre
strained pursuit of private advan
tage is, in the long run, self-defeat
ing,” Dr. Ackley told the business
men.

Paperless Credit

Within Decade

Foreseen by ABA
Preauthorized paperless credit
will be a fact within the next dec
ade according to more than half
of the bankers who participated in
a recently published survey con
ducted by the American Bankers
Association.
The Operations and Automation
Division of the ABA sent question
naires to 2,945 banks, or 22.5 per
cent of the nation’s 13,095 com
mercial banks. Forty-five per cent
of those questioned, or 1,327 banks,
responded. Their replies are the
basis for the “1972 National Auto
mation Study” now available from
the ABA.
Of the responding banks, 143
had computer processing arrange
ments through a holding company,
356 with a correspondent bank,
and 356 had on-site operations.
Based on 1,136 responses, 27.3
per cent of the banks in the $10- to
$49-million deposit range expected
to be involved in the development
of new applications with other
banks.
The bankers were asked which
primary input technique they
thought was the most feasible with
in the next three years for banks
offering credit cards. Optical Char
acter Recognition (OCR) drew the
biggest response, 31.8 per cent,
from those in banks with over $500million in deposits. However, of the
total 241 respondents to this ques
tion, 39.8 per cent believe Magnetic
Ink Character Recognition (MIRC)
is the most feasible.
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Now we can tell
three million more people
that you’re a good guy
(If you are)
With your help we can tell mil
lions more next year.
There’s new energy at your Better Busi
ness Bureau. Our recently-formed national
Council is helping local Bureaus pool their
strength. Businessmen everywhere are helping.
We’re increasing our service. We’re doing more
now than ever to encourage good relations be
tween you and consumers.
Our capacity to handle phone calls has
increased by over three million a year. That
means we can tell three million more consumers
about a company’s reputation or help them
when they call with complaints.
That’s three million more consumers
who will have a better chance of getting their
money’s worth. And a better opinion of busi
ness. Because business itself is the force behind
the Better Business Bureau.
If we can keep growing like this, we’ll be
able to increase our service to three million
more people next year. But our growth is more
than telephone calls.
We’ve expanded our consumer educa
tion programs, through radio announcements
and printed materials, to reach ten million
shoppers with good buying advice. We’d like to
reach even more.
We’ve established fifty arbitration
panels across the country where consumers and
businessmen can iron out problems together.
Hopefully, fifty is just the beginning.
We’ve started to computerize so Bureaus
can have up-to-date information on consumer
attitudes and marketplace developments. We
intend to finish.
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And we’ve just begun a public service
advertising campaign with the help of The
Advertising Council. It will tell millions of Amer
icans that the Better Business Bureau is their
place to “speak up” to get their money’s worth.
The more we grow, the more we can let
consumers know that we—and you—care
about them.
Would you like to help? To learn how,
just use the coupon below. (We knew you were
a good guy.)

Council of Better Business Bureaus
845 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022
Please tell me how the Better Business Bureau can improve
our relations with consumers and how 1 can help.
Name___________________________________________
Company________________________________________

Address_____ _ ___________________________________

City-------------------------- State

Zip

Council of
Better Business Bureaus
advertising contributed for the public good
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Computer models are coming into greater use in
large companies today. The question is: are they
coming into great enough use? Or is the "black
box" phobia still preventing their full utilization.
Here’s the case history of one successful application.

COMPUTER MODELS: ‘BLACK BOX’ OR

MANAGEMENT-ORIENTED?
by Michael C. Luecke
CIBA-GEIGY

o meet the challenge of an in

ment decisions are based primarily
creasingly complex business en
upon quantifiable or generated data
vironment, modern companies are —i.e., where rational analysis can
developing computer models in
replace intuition.
growing numbers. This recent trend
New probability techniques like
has been inevitable for two rea
risk analysis, for example, permit
sons: (1) The constantly improving
management to use simulation
models which automatically take
methods of management science,
the consequences of risk—or uncer
with greater reliance on sophisti
tainty—into account for various un
cated quantitative techniques; and
(2) The rapidly increasing speed
certain input data. Older methods
like linear programing are enjoying
and capacity of large computers
a resurgence of popularity outside
which make the new methods feasi
ble. Consequently, models are find
the traditional areas of application
such as production; “optimization”
ing new applications in nearly every
models are now feasible for solving
facet of business in which manage

T
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a broad spectrum of business prob
lems. Sensitivity analysis, which
provides management with quick
answers to critical “What if?” ques
tions (e.g., optimistic and pessimis
tic variations of key input param
eters ) is often incorporated in
simulation models. A time-shared
computer terminal is commonly
used to achieve an “interaction” be
tween manager and computer in
sensitivity analysis. Large “on-line”
corporate models are also emerg
ing in greater numbers.
Why, then, do so many “good”
computer models meet a premature
17

The model, while meeting management’s technical requirements must also be “sold” . . .

death—on a shelf—through lack of
use or interest? Too often the an
swer lies not with the technical de
sign of the model itself but with
the “black box” image the model
gives to the decision maker.
Shelving a technically sound model
—or not using it to fullest advan
tage—is particularly tragic when
one considers the important role
such models can play in the de
cision-making process, not to men
tion the considerable time and ex
pense normally required to develop
these models.
The purpose of this article is to:
(1) Shed some light on the com
mon pitfalls which prevent most
companies from getting the payoff
they should from computer models;
(2) Present some guidelines on
how to develop a successful model;
and (3) Illustrate the guidelines
with a case study.

Why models fail

If a manager cannot understand
a computer model, naturally he
will not have full confidence in it.
The obvious result: the manager
will be reluctant to use the model
for important decision-making. It
is crucial, therefore, that future
models shrug off the “black box”
image so that they will be more
readily—even enthusiastically — ac
cepted and used by management.
Is it any wonder that manage
ment is slow to embrace any deci
sion-making tool which is often de-
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ester, N. Y., where he
was a member of the
"MARS" corporate mod
eling project in the stra
tegy, planning, and simulation department.
Mr. Luecke served as a logistics planning offi

cer in the Army. He has a B.S.E.E. from the
University of Notre Dame and an M.B.A.
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livered to them with one or more
of the following characteristics:
• Explanations are in technical
jargon and computerese.
• Printouts appear in cluttered,
cryptic format difficult to interpret.
• Only a specialist can use the
model.
• Input data must be translated
in terms of the model’s abstract or
inflexible input format.
• Modifications are difficult when
changes are necessary.
• Documentation is poor—no sin
gle person “understands” the entire
model.
• Fictitious or unrealistic input
data were used during the test
phase.
• The model is more sophisti
cated (and complicated) than nec
essary.

Despite the technical competence
of the model builders, most models
being developed contain several of
the negative characteristics listed
above, at least to some degree.1 In
other words, these models are not
management oriented. But whose
fault is the “black box” image—the
model builders’ or management’s?
The blame can usually be shared
by both.
Guidelines for the model builder

Although usually a specialist, the
model builder can easily overcome
most of the major problems by fol
lowing these guidelines:

Jargon—Ordinary English can
replace much of the technical jar
gon to convey the basic ideas to
management. For instance, why
should management be less im
pressed by the term “external fac
tors” than “exogenous variables”?
Printout—A model is often judged
1 Schrieber, Albert N., Corporate Simu
lation Models, Seattle, University of
Washington, 1970.

by the appearance of its printout.
Clear, well-organized output “re
port” formats—without the cryptic
abbreviations—require very little
additional computer coding. Com
puter graphics are also easy to
program if a plotter is available.
The payoff: the printout is suitable
for presentation, and nearly any
manager in the company can inter
pret the results!
Use—The model should always
be programed with the user in
mind. The user instruction manual
should be comprehensive, includ
ing examples, so that a nontechnical
person can easily use the model.
User seminars may be given to
supplement training. Depending
upon the model’s application, it can
be cataloged on disk or tape in
the computer library, accessible to
numerous authorized users.
Input—The model’s input data
should be in a flexible form which
is familiar to the user. For example,
if sales volume is always expressed
in pounds companywide, why use
tons for the model input?
Modifications—The model should
always be programed in building
blocks, or “modules,” using sub
models and subroutines as much
as possible. The modular approach
permits enormous advantages in
flexibility and also cuts total devel
opment time. In addition, any data
subject to change should be pro
gramed as input to the model. As
an extreme (but actual) example,
one large model did not handle the
“date” as input—i.e., the model had
to be “re-programed” each new day
the model was run! Finally, a gen
eralized model is much more ver
satile (and useful) than a model
developed for one narrow appli
cation.
Documentation — The computer
program should be well documented
as it is developed, and kept up-todate as revisions and personnel
turnovers occur.
Testing— Depending on the type
Management Adviser

of model, it should be tested using
“live” input data, if possible. Other
wise, validate the model with real
istic test data submitted by man
agement.
Sophistication—Keep the model
as basic and simple as possible.
Unnecessary sophistication, how
ever impressive, will only hinder
development and may cause prob
lems later.

Remember that the finished prod
uct, while meeting management’s
technical requirements, must never
theless be “sold” to management.
Some of the most vital elements of
this “marketing” job include: (1)
correct “packaging” (e.g., easy to
understand printouts and docu
mentation); and (2) good “promo
tion” (e.g., nontechnical, dynamic
presentation). In short, deliver the
model with management’s perspec
tive clearly in mind.
Guidelines for management

What steps can management take
to ensure that it gets a useful prod
uct from the model builders? First,
management should actively parti
cipate in the model’s design phase,
giving the model builders a clear
definition of its requirements. Man
agement participation is especially
important if the model is a “topdown” type; interaction and feed
back are essential. Management
should never delegate “carte
blanche” responsibility for the
model’s overall design to a special
ist. Second, management should try
to keep informed on the new quan
titative methods, learning at least
the basic concepts and terminology.
This learning process is not just
going “halfway” with the specialists
—it is a necessary part of executive
development. Finally, management
must realize that models, partic
ularly corporate models, usually re
quire several man-years by highly
qualified (and expensive) special
ists to develop and implement.
Total development cost can easily
exceed $100,000 for a single model
—and this is precisely the reason
that the end result should not be a
“black box” on a shelf.
January-February, 1973

Shortly after its merger in 1970,
CIBA-GEIGY’s Basel, Switzerland,
headquarters began an improved
formal planning program for its
extensive multinational operations.
As a part of this program, manage
ment recognized the great need for
a tailormade, sophisticated capital
investment simulation model to as
sist in project evaluation, capital
budgeting, and investment strategy
decisions. Both risk analysis and
sensitivity analysis were desired as
methods; both internal rate of re
turn (DCF) and Net Present Value
were preferred as the primary yard
sticks of financial performance.
Since capital investment decision
making was decentralized, the
model would need to be universal
in scope for implementation and
use by subsidiaries around the
world. Although standard invest
ment procedures had been estab
lished, the model would have to be
versatile enough to accommodate
the various local tax laws, depreci
ation methods, investment grants,
etc. In addition, management
wanted a model that would be easy
to use and interpret—i.e., no “black
box.”

Designing the model

The author was assigned the
challenging task of building the
model to management’s require
ments within one year’s time. It
was decided very early in the de
sign stage to follow the “modular”
approach so that four different ver
sions of the basic model could be
easily assembled and implemented
as “packages,” depending on the
user’s application and/or hardware
capability:

• Sensitivity model, using timeshared terminal
• Sensitivity model, using prin
ter and computer graphics
• Risk model, with computer
graphics
• Risk model, without computer
graphics.

What steps can management

take to ensure that it gets
a useful product from the
model builders? First,

management should actively
participate in the model's

design phase, giving the
model builders a clear

definition of its requirements.
Management participation
is especially important if

the model is a “topdown"

type; interaction and
feedback are essential . . .

Second, management should
try to keep informed on
the new quantitative
methods, learning at least

the basic concepts and
terminology . . . Finally,

management must realize
that models, particularly

corporate models, usually
require several man-years by

highly qualified and
expensive specialists to

develop and implement.

Due to its modular design, indi
vidual subroutines of the different
versions could be programed and
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EXHIBIT I

GENERAL FLOW CHART OF MODEL
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debugged independently, speeding
the total development time. In fact,
the sensitivity models were already
operational while the final subrou
tines of risk analysis were still being
debugged.
What the model can do

It was decided to make the
model as flexible and general as

possible to ensure maximum use.
Some of the model’s major capa
bilities include:

• Acceptance of nearly any type
or size of investment project.
• Flexible handling of a wide
variety of input data (up to 75 dif
ferent types of variables).
• The various input data can be
input on a quarterly, yearly, or

constant basis over the life of the
investment.
• Options include: five economic
indexes (e.g., inflation); three
methods of depreciation; two tax
methods.
• Up to 67 key input parameters
can be varied singly or in any com
bination in sensitivity analysis.
• The eight most “risky” input
parameters can assume a wide

EXHIBIT 2
OUTPUT RESULTS FROM SINGLE SENSITIVITY RUN
CIBA-GEIGY
PRIVATE
DATA

PROJECT: DEMONSTRATION RUN
DATE: JULY 4, 1971
CURRENCY: LIRA

CAPITAL INVESTMENT
SIMULATION MODEL
OUTPUT

DATA

SUMMARY OF PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS

RUN NO. 0

INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN ON INVESTMENT (AFTER TAXES)....................................................................................................................................

16%

NET PRESENT VALUE (000) (AFTER TAX) AT COST OF CAPITAL OF 10.00%.......................................................................................................... 3368.

PROFITABILITY INDEX (AFTER TAX).................................................................................................................................................................................. 152.
PAY-BACK TIME & DATE (AFTER TAX) AT COST OF CAPITAL OF 10.00%...................................................................... 27 QUARTERS/1979, QUARTER 3
PAY-BACK TIME & DATE (AFTER TAX) UNDISCOUNTED.................................................................................................... 21 QUARTERS/1978, QUARTER 1

MAXIMUM NET CUMULATIVE CASH OUTFLOW (000) & DATE (AFTER-TAX, UNDISCOUNT.)..............................................-6248./1973, QUARTER 4

BREAKEVEN DATE (TOTAL REVENUES = TOTAL EXPENSES) (BEFORE-TAX, ST.-LINE)..................................................................... 1974, QUARTER 1

RETURN ON SALES (BEFORE TAX, ST.-LINE)....................................................................................................................................................................... 53.5%

CIBA-GEIGY
PRIVATE
DATA

CAPITAL INVESTMENT
SIMULATION MODEL
OUTPUT

ANNUAL
YEAR

TOTAL REVENUES
(000)

PROJECT: DEMONSTRATION RUN
DATE: JULY 4, 1971
CURRENCY: LIRA

DATA

PERFORMANCE

TOTAL EXPENSES
(000)

RUN NO. 0
PROFIT (PRE-TAX)(1)
(000)

NET CASH FLOWS (2)
(000)
DISCOUNTED:
AT 16.% AT 10.0% AT 0%

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

0.
200.
983.
3039.
4040.
3974.
4002.
4039.
5553.
3788.
3029.
1325.

700.
1072.
1585.
1828.
2001.
1794.
1368.
1589.
1343.
1202.
881.
442.

-700.
-872.
-602.
1211.
2040.
2180.
2634.
2450.
4210.
2587.
2149.
883.

-5620.
-1038.
-597.
739.
1035.
870.
986.
766.
1070.
575.
411.
732.

-5189.
-1023.
-620.
816.
1216.
1091.
1319.
1094.
1631.
936.
714.
1383.

-4590.
-1000.
-658.
951.
1562.
1548.
2068.
1896.
3123.
1980.
1669.
3682.

TOTAL

33973.

15803.

18170.

-73.

3368.

12229.

(1) USING STRAIGHT-LINE DEPRECIATION

(2) USING DECLINING-BAL (AFTER-TAX)
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EXHIBIT 3
COMPUTER GRAPHICS FOR SENSITIVITY RUN

range of alternative values, with
corresponding probability weights
in risk analysis. (The model is flex
ible enough to treat these param
eters as mutually independent or
interdependent in the Monte Carlo
simulation.)
• Sensitivity and risk analysis
can be used together to test “shifts”
in critical input parameters.
A general flow chart of the basic
model is shown in Exhibit 1 on
page 20.
Using the model

Management can submit all rele
vant input data associated with an
investment project by filling in a
specially designed questionnaire.
This questionnaire is “keyed” to
card layout sheets for easy key
punching of input data. The model
is programed to automatically
print out all the input data in
volved, in labeled format, along
with the final results. In other
22

words, management knows exactly
what input data the computer pro
cessed, lending greater credibility
to the results.
A user instruction manual was
written in step-by-step fashion and
filled with examples. Although so
phisticated, the model is simple to
use and interpret—even a secretary
can run the model and get the cor
rect result. User seminars have
proved helpful. The model is now
being implemented worldwide.
The basic output results from a
single sensitivity run of a typical
investment project are illustrated
in Exhibit 2 on page 21. The “re
port” format is suitable for presen
tation and is extremely easy to in
terpret. The various yardsticks of
performance are printed out in the
top table; a “pro forma” income
statement with net cash flows from
the entire project is printed out in
the lower table.
A computer-generated graph of
the cumulative net cash flows over
the life of the investment is shown

in Exhibit 3 above for the single
sensitivity run. The cumulative
flows are plotted in two curves:
undiscounted and discounted at
cost of capital. The dramatic effect
of a 10 per cent rate over an 11year horizon is illustrated.
A graphical summary of a com
plete set of sensitivity runs is dis
played in Exhibit 4 on page 23. This
example shows the results of a
“classical” sensitivity analysis—i.e.,
only one input variable is changed
for each run. CIBA-GEIGY execu
tives favor this graph due to its
simplicity in identifying the cri
tical input variables in the sensi
tivity analysis. Those variables
whose curves are most horizontal
or “flat” are most sensitive to
change; conversely, those variables
whose curves are most vertical or
“steep” are least sensitive to
change. The non-linear relation
ships inherent in sensitivity anal
ysis are clearly evident.
The basic output results of risk
analysis are depicted in Exhibit 5
Management Adviser

on page 24. It is interesting to note
that this sample risk analysis and
the sample sensitivity analysis
shown previously were generated
from the same investment project.
The great advantage of risk anal
ysis in capital investment studies
is apparent. In risk analysis, the
computer makes hundreds of
different DCF calculations (iter
ations), each based on a random
selection of the eight “risky” input
variables—according to their prob
abilities, or chances, of occurrence.
(The selection process is like spin
ning a roulette wheel—i.e., Monte
Carlo simulation.) An internal rate
of return on investment ( DCFROI) and net present value (not
shown) are computed for each ran
dom combination, or set, of input
data involved. The output result
of risk analysis is a probability dis
tribution (“Risk Profile”) of all the
possible outcomes (i.e., return-oninvestment results). The cumula
tive “Risk Profile” (graph, upper
left, page 24) gives management a
clear picture of the risks associated
with each possible return on invest
ment (i.e., the chance of exceed
ing a given return). The ordinary
“Risk Profile” (graph, upper right,
page 24) is the probability distri
bution and the basis for the cumu
lative “Risk Profile.” This distribu
tion is approximately normal or bell
shaped in this case.
The table shown in the lower half
of Exhibit 5 contains the various
statistical calculations of the risk
analysis results. In this case, 500
iterations were performed, and the
risk profiles shown reflect a graphi
cal summary of the 500 different
return-on-investment calculations.
The main statistical measures are:
(1) the average value (“Expected
Value”) of the 500 results; and (2)
the statistical variation (“Standard
Deviation”) of the 500 results. Bas
ically, the greater the standard
deviation, the greater the degree of
risk associated with the project.
Sensitivity analysis, on the other
hand, does not explicitly take risk
into account and can only give
management a rough idea of “op
timistic” and “pessimistic” out
comes. For high-risk investment
January-February, 1973

EXHIBIT 4

GRAPHICAL SUMMARY FOR SET OF SENSITIVITY RUNS
CAPITAL INVESTMENT SIMULATION MODEL

projects, risk analysis will often
give the decision maker a dramatic
ally improved picture of the odds
of making a high return—or a low
return. Another benefit of risk-based
decision making is that manage
ment can rank numerous alternative
investment proposals according to
degree of risk as well as return on
investment.2
2 This “Efficiency Frontier” concept is
developed by David Hertz in “Invest
ment Policies That Pay Off,” Harvard
Business Review, Jan.-Feb., 1968. For
a more detailed explanation of risk an
alysis in general, also refer to this article
as well as the earlier article by Hertz,
“Risk Analysis in Capital Investment,”
Harvard Business Review, Jan.-Feb.,
1964.

There is no doubt that computer
models will be developed in in
creasing numbers, and that a man
ager is more than willing to use a
model as a decision-making tool—
if he has confidence in the model
and can understand it. Otherwise,
there is a good chance that the
model will eventually become a
“black box“ on a shelf. It has been
demonstrated that a managementoriented model can be developed
by following a few common-sense
guidelines. The model builder is
not solely responsible for develop
ing a successful model—manage
ment must play an active role. The
end result will be a model which
is not only technically sound, but
effectively used.
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EXHIBIT 5
COMPLETE RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS
CAPITAL INVESTMENT SIMULATION MODEL

RISK ANALYSIS

RISK ANALYSIS

DCF-ROI PROFILE

DCF-ROI PROFILE

0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00 100.00

CHANCE (%) OF EXCEEDING DCF-ROl

CAPITAL INVESTMENT SIMULATION MODEL

DCF-ROI (% AFTER TAX)

DCF-ROI (% AFTER TAX)

RISK

ANALYSIS

CAPITAL INVESTMENT
SIMULATION MODEL

CIBA-GEIGY
PRIVATE
DATA

OUTPUT

PROJECT: DEMONSTRATION RUN
DATE: JULY 4, 1971
CURRENCY: LIRA

DATA

INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN ON INVESTMENT (% AFTER TAXES)

MOST PROBABLE VALUE ..........................................................

16. (1)

AVERAGE VALUE

15.5(2)

.......................................................................

STANDARD DEVIATION (SIGMA)

............................. 11.2%/

95% CONFIDENCE LIMITS ............................................ 15.3-

1.7(3)
15.6(4)

SAMPLE SIZE, THIS RUN ..........................................................

500 (5)

RESULT WITHOUT RISK ANALYSIS ..........................................

16. (6)

(1) MODE.
(2) ARITHMETIC MEAN ('EXPECTED VALUE' OF THIS ANALYSIS).
(3) % OF ALL VALUES FALL WITHIN + & — ONE SIGMA OF THE AVERAGE, IF THE DISTRIBUTION IS NORMAL (GAUSSIAN).

(4) 95% SURE THAT 'TRUE' AVERAGE VALUE LIES WITHIN THESE LIMITS, IF DISTRIBUTION OF MEANS IS NORMAL (GAUSSIAN).
(5) TOTAL NO. OF ITERATIONS BY COMPUTER.
(6) WITH ALL INPUT DATA FIXED (I.E., DETERMINISTIC RATHER THAN PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS).

24

Management Adviser

Discounted cash flow analysis, so widely used by
many companies today, all too often has a fatal flaw
in its assumptions—a flaw that can lead to serious
errors in decision making—

UNCERTAINTY IN PRESENT
VALUE CALCULATIONS
by Robert N. Williamson
University of Notre Dame

is generally agreed that dis
counted cash flow (DCF) tech
niques for evaluating capital ex
penditures are superior to other
more established criteria such as
payback and the accounting rate
of return. DCF techniques, how
ever, are usually presented to ac
countants in a manner—i.e., with
an assumption of certainty—which
is not entirely applicable to real
world situations. Typically, this is
done either by ignoring the prob
lem of uncertainty or by using the
means of probability distributions
t

I
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in the DCF calculations. It is not
generally realized that the use of
single-valued estimates (the means)
in place of the probability distribu
tions, in addition to imparting a
false sense of accuracy, will in
most situations lead to biased esti
mates of the net present value of
a proposed investment project and
thus introduce the possibility of in
correct decisions.
This possibility can best be seen
through illustrative problems. For
example, consider the investment
opportunity described in Exhibit 1
on page 26.

Using the means of the relevant
variables as the single-valued esti
mates, this project would have a
net present value at a cost of cap
ital of 10 per cent or $81.60. Ex
hibit 2, on page 26, however, pre
sents the expected present value of
this project taking account of the
distribution of possible values for
the useful life of the asset (N) and
the yearly net cash flows (S). It
can be seen from Exhibit 2 that the
expected net present value ($53.40)
is less than net present value com
puted using single-valued estimates
($81.60).
25

There is always the possibility of making an incorrect decision when the means are used

An analysis of Exhibits 1 and 2
indicates that there is a distinction
to be made between the present
value of the expected values (Ex
hibit 1) and the expected value of
the present values (Exhibit 2); it
is contended here that the latter
approach yields superior results
and that the $53.40 calculated in
Exhibit 2 does, in fact, represent
the average net present value which
could be expected from undertak
ing a large number of similar
projects.

It should be pointed out that the
different results in Exhibits 1 and
2 are directly related to the nature
of discounting itself. As assumed
in Exhibit 1, the expected value of
the service life is five years, with
equal probabilities of an actual life
span being four to six years. Thus,
in Exhibit 2, equal weight is given
to the present value (PV) of the
combinations which include a fouryear life and those which include a
six-year life. The DCF techniques,
however, introduce an additional

EXHIBIT 2
INVESTMENT A
Possible
Values

Variable
Current Cost (C)

$7,500

Probability
of Value (P)

Expected
Value (E)

1.00

$7,500

........

Yearly Net
Cash Flows (S)

Useful Service Life (N)

$1,900
2,000
2,100

.3
.4
.3

$ 570
800
630

E(S)

1.0
..

$2,000

4 years
5
6

.25
.50
.25

E(N)

1 years
2.5
1.5
.....
5.0 years

1.00
=

...... "

Net Present Value (NPV) using C,E(S), E(N) at 10% = $81.60

EXHIBIT I
INVESTMENT A
Possible
Combination of Values
N
4
4
4
5
5
5
6
6
6

Probability of
Combinations

s

(P)*

1,900
2,000
2,100
1,900
2,000
2,100
1,900
2,000
2,100

.075
.100
.075
.150
.200
.150
.075
.100
.075

Present Value of
Combinations (10%)
(PV)
$6,022.81
6,339.80
6,656.79
7,202.52
7,581.60
7,960.68
8,275.07
8,710.60
9,146.13

1.000

$ 451.711
633.980
499.259
1,080.378
1,516.320
1,194.102
620.630
871.060
685.960

$7,553.40
Current Cost

E(NPV)
* p = P(N)P(S); this assumes N and S are
independent.
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Expected
Values
(E)

7,500.000

$

53.40

weighting factor; and thus the PV’s
of the cash flows do not change in
direct proportion to the changes in
service life, which are assumed
when single-valued estimates are
used, as in Exhibit 1. In fact, the un
certainty as to the actual service life
is the only factor causing the dif
ference between the two computed
net PV’s in these exhibits; that is,
the uncertainty as to the yearly net
cash flows does not contribute to
this difference—because the PV’s of
the cash flows do change in direct
proportion to changes in those
flows.1
Exhibit 3, on page 27, illustrates
this point. A similar computation of
expected net present value of an
other project is shown there. Invest
ment B is similar to A except that
there is no uncertainty surrounding
the yearly cash flows—they are
known to be $2,000. There is uncer
tainty as to the actual service life,
however, just as before. It can be
seen that the expected net PV of In
vestment B is the same as A
($53.40), even though there is this
assumption as to certainty of B’s
yearly net cash flows. This indi
cates that the uncertainty about
useful service life is the cause of
the difference described above.
This difference in general will in
crease as the variance of the ex
pected service life increases.2 An
example is shown in Exhibit 4; the
expected net PV of Investment C
is there calculated to be negative—
that is, C is unprofitable at a 10
per cent cost of capital. Investment
C is identical to B except for a
1 Using single-valued estimates instead
of the distribution of possible future dis
count rates will also introduce bias; in
the examples, however, the applicable
discount rate is assumed to be known
with certainty.
2 This difference will decrease as the
expected life of the project increases, all
else (including the variance of N) be
ing constant.
Management Adviser

EXHIBIT 3
INVESTMENT B

N

S

4
5
6

2,000
2,000
2,000

PV(10%)

P(N)
.25
.50
.25

$6,339.80
7,581.60
8,710.60

1.00

E
$1,584.95
3,790.80
2,177.65

$7,553.40
Current Cost
E(NPV)

7,500.00

53.40

$

EXHIBIT 4
INVESTMENT
N

S

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000

P(N)

.05
.10
.20
.30
.20
.10
.05

c
E

PV(10%)
$3,471.00
4,973.80
6,339.80
7,581.60
8,710.60
9,736.80
10,669.80

$

173.55
497.38
1,267.96
2,274.48
1,742.12
973.68
553.49

$7,462.66

1.00
Current Cost

7,500.00

E(NPV)

$-37.34

. . . the expected value of
the service life [of the

investment project] is five
years, with equal probabilities

larger variance in the expected
service life; thus, the net PV cal
culated using single-valued esti
mates would be positive.
Three means identical

A comparison of Exhibits 1 and
4, above, illustrates the possibil
ity of making an incorrect deci
sion when single-valued estimates
are used. The net PV calculated us
ing the means of the relevant vari
ables for Investment C will be the
same as that of A and B because
the means are identical for all three
projects. Conventional DCF analy
sis would thus indicate that C be
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accepted. Exhibit 4, however, shows
that if many projects identical to C
were accepted, they would on the
average be unprofitable.
An analysis similar to those
shown in Exhibits 2 and 4 could
be made for each investment proj
ect as the opportunity arises. Often,
however, because of the wide
range of possible variables and be
cause of the probability of strong
dependence among these variables,
it is more efficient to perform sim
ulations, either manually or with
the aid of the computer. The simu
lation approach is an ideal one for
incorporating into the analysis
probability distributions which are
either assumed (such as a normal
distribution) or which are devel
oped from the firm’s actual expe
riences. These simulations can be
designed to estimate the probabil
ity of various outcomes and thus
serve as a means to evaluate the
risk inherent in a particular project.
For those cases where there is un
certainty about the project’s life
span, these same simulation meth
ods yield the additional benefit of
giving an unbiased estimate of the
net present value of the project.

of an actual life span being

four to six years. Thus,
in Exhibit 2, equal weight
is given to the present value
of the combinations which

include a four-year life
and those which include

a six-year life.
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To companies engaged mainly in fulfilling contracts,
return on every resource used is vital. This article
describes a model used by a Government contractor
to ensure the best possible ROI at every level—

‘MANAGING’ ROI ON BUSINESS
CONTRACTS—THROUGH SIMULATION
by John F. Beckmann
The Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc.

to ensure the financial
stability and growth of an enter
prise, management’s concern for
attainment of desired profit objec
tives must be matched by compar
able regard for the value and scale
of scarce resources being employed
for the generation of profit. As a
result, corporate financial manage
ment must always stress the analy
sis and optimization of return on
investment (ROI) when planning,
measuring, and evaluating a com
pany’s performance.
Due to the complexity of ROI
analysis, management has been
looking increasingly towards the
development and utilization of
computer techniques, such as sim
ulation models, for assistance in
the evaluation of alternate courses
of action.
n order

I
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This article discusses how a rela
tively simple computer planning
model can assist top management
in delegating responsibility for ROI
management by applying ROI cri
teria to day-to-day financial deci
sion making in a company engaged
primarily in the fulfillment of busi
ness contracts.
The model serves as a financial
tool for the evaluation of return on
investment opportunities in the
context of contract negotiation as
well as in the planning and con
trolling of contract performance.
Managing ROI

Return on investment is a meas
ure of financial yield or produc
tivity. It relates the amounts earned
(usually on an annual basis) to the

amounts invested for production of
earnings, thereby serving as a yard
stick for evaluation of alternative
investment opportunities. In order
to effectively compete for and retain
invested capital, an enterprise must
normally strive to maximize the
return on investment being offered
to its current and prospective in
vestors. For measuring overall man
agement effectiveness it is appro
priate to relate performance to the
total capital base at management’s
disposal. This includes, in addition
to stockholders’ investments and re
tained earnings, the resources made
available through long-term debt
capital. The return on total capital
employed is expressed as:

ROI =

NI + I
NW + LTD
Management Adviser

NI + I
“ FA + CA — CL
NI + I
= FA + NWC

= net income after
taxes
I
= interest expense
after tax-effect
(which is a cost of
capital associated
with long-term
debt)
NW = net worth, or
stockholders’
equity
LTD = long-term debt
FA = fixed assets
CA = current assets
CL = current liabilities
NWC = net working
capital.

where NI

A difficulty associated with im
plementing a company-wide goal
of attaining and surpassing ROI
objectives has been the establish
ment of effective means for dele
gating responsibility for ROI con
trol to lower levels of management
and for assigning measures of ac
countability for ROI performance.
Traditionally, ROI considerations
have been applied to financial man
agement functions such as capital
budgeting, product-line decisions,
corporate acquisition, expansion,
and venture analyses, cash man
agement, and investment policies.
However, their application to re
curring operating decisions, and to
the evaluation of operational man
agement performance (e.g., sales,
manufacturing, production control,
purchasing, invoicing, shipping) has
been less extensive. Yet the results
of each of these decisions can have
significant ROI implications.
Management concepts for apply
ing ROI criteria to recurring oper
ating decisions and for delegating
ROI management responsibilities
have been developed and success
fully implemented in the ABC
Manufacturing Company which is
primarily engaged in performing
on Federal Government contracts.
However, this approach has general
applicability to most commercial
January-February, 1973

enterprises which are involved in
negotiating and performing under
any type of manufacturing or ser
vice contract. This includes a wide
array of non-defense/Government
contractors whose total resources
committed towards the fulfillment
of contractual obligations are sub
stantial relative to the firms’ total
investments and where the con
tractual instruments used resemble
those used for contracts with the
Federal Government.
This management approach re
volves around the use of a financial
model whose basic purpose is to
assist management in optimizing
the returns earned on individual
contracts relative to the company’s
investments necessary for execution
of those contracts. The model pro
vides the capability of studying
and testing the forecasted effects
on cash flow, net contract invest
ment, and return on net contract
investment of a wide variety of al
ternative negotiable contract terms
and conditions, and alternative op
erating and performance character
istics. Through rapid feedback of
simulated results, information is
made available promptly for use
in making decisions and in evalu
ating progress. The overall objec
tive of optimizing the return on
net contract investment on many
individual contracts is, through re
peated use of the model, enhance
ment of ROI on a company-wide
scale.
Financial analysis using the sim
ulation model has resulted in im
provements in the ROI earned on
individual contracts and also in
changes in organization-wide poli
cies and procedures. These, in turn,
improved the ROI realized on all
contracts. Equally as important, the
frequent application of the model
has caused a dissemination of
“ROI consciousness” throughout
levels of management previously
unconcerned by these concepts.

. . . this approach has
general applicability to most

commercial enterprises
involved in negotiating and

performing under any type
of manufacturing or

service contract. This

includes a wide array of
non-defense Government

contractors whose total

resources committed towards

the fulfillment of
contractual obligations are
substantial relative to the

firms' total investments and
where the contractual

instruments used resemble

those used for contracts
with the Federal Government.

The contract ROI model

The contract ROI model was
developed primarily in response to
the need, during contract negotia29

EXHIBIT I

NET CONTRACT INVESTMENT
Items Which Increase Contract Investment:
• Receivables
• Inventories
• Deferred Engineering Development
• Goods Shipped, But Not Billed
Items Which Reduce Contract Investment:
• Current Liabilities
• Unliquidated Progress Payments
• Contract Price Reserves

EXHIBIT 2

CONTRACT R.O.I. MODEL: INPUT VARIABLES
Contract Terms and Conditions:
• Contract Sell Price; Negotiated G&A Rate; Contract Fee
• Progress Payment Billing Rates*
• Progress Payment Liquidation Rates*
• Delivery and Price Schedule; Milestone Billing Dates*
• Letter Contracts: Price Definition Target Date*
• Incentive Contracts: Share Rate, Ceiling Price, Delivery Incentive and/or Penalties;
Target Cost, and Target Profit*

Performance Variables:
• Time-Phased Direct Labor (and Overhead) Incurrence*
* Time-Phased Material/Subcontract Cost Incurrence*
• Contract Schedule Changes Affecting Deliveries and Sales Billed, and/or Direct
Cost Incurrence
• Linear Direct Cost Variance (in per cent)
Administrative Variables:
• Expected G&A Rates (by fiscal year)*
• Expected Corporate Income Tax Rate*
• Cash Collection/Payment Time Lags*
• Invoicing Time Lags*

* Indicates input variable which is required by the computer program.

tions, for financial information spe
cifically related to improving ROI
potential through the negotiation
of favorable contract terms and
conditions. However, through ex
pansion of the initial design con
cept, the model has been adopted
by ABC as a financial tool during
three phases of the contractual
cycle: the negotiation, planning,
and performance phases.
During the negotiation phase,
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the model enables negotiators to
make rapid trade-off analyses re
garding the effect of various nego
tiable contract terms and condi
tions, such as profit rate, progress
payments and liquidations, mile
stone billings, cost and delivery
incentives/penalties, and ceiling
prices, and to determine their fore
casted effects on the return on in
vestment which can potentially be
realized on the contract.
During the planning phase of
the contract, the model is useful in
testing the effect on ROI and other
factors of varying certain contract
management parameters which are
controllable by financial and/or
program management. Performance
objectives based on alternate simu
lation results can then be estab
lished for each contract studied.
During the performance phase,
the model is used to compare ac

tual contract performance with the
pre-determined goals for cash flow
and ROI, and deviations from plan
ned performance are noted and
analyzed. As a result either cor
rective actions are taken or revised
objectives are established.
Fundamental to the model’s ulti
mate success was the decision,
early in the model’s development,
to limit the model’s scope to those
aspects of ROI which were mean
ingful and controllable by the levels
of management being addressed.
This decision not only simplified
the initial model design process,
but also enhanced the model’s
early payoff by encouraging ac
ceptance and utilization of the
model as a practical management
tool.
The investment element in the
model’s ROI function was limited
to the concept of “net contract in
vestment.” This can be defined as
the incremental net working capital
which must be invested by the
contractor in order to perform un
der an individual contract. It speci
fically excludes investment in fixed
assets, even if those assets are used
in performing under the contract.
Exclusion of fixed assets from the
contract ROI model was justified
on the grounds that the acquisition
of these assets had presumably
undergone previous rate of return
analyses not necessarily directly
related to an individual contract.
They were omitted also for practi
cal reasons due to the difficulty of
equitably allocating fixed asset
utilization to individual contracts.
Exhibit 1, left, lists the items in
cluded in, and their effect on, net
contract investment.
The criteria used in selecting those
items listed were that they are
partially controllable by middle
management, are affected to a de
gree by negotiated contractual
terms, and are directly assignable
to individual contracts. The last fac
tor became particularly important
when the model was expanded to
include the monitoring and updat
ing of contract projections, which
necessitated the extraction of finan
cial information from accounting
Management Adviser

records to reflect past events in the
model.
The design of the model began
with an examination of the key
financial parameters confronting
middle management decision mak
ers and their relationships to return
on contract investment. As a result,
the potential input variables were
grouped into two main categories:
contract terms and conditions, and
contract performance variables. The
former group of variables are gen
erally fixed throughout the life of
the contract, while the latter group
vary over time throughout the con
tractual period. The time units used
in the model are self-definable, but
in practice monthly increments are
commonly used to reflect conven
tional accounting periods.
Exhibit 2 on page 30 lists several
of the variables accepted as input
by the model. Multiple values can
be accepted for many of the vari
ables listed. Through iterative loops
in the program, the model is run re
peatedly for different combinations
of these variables.
Using the inputs supplied, the
model produces time-phased cash
flow and net contract investment
projections, with subsidiary infor
mation regarding the various ele
ments of contract investment. Also,
the program calculates the pro
jected return on net contract in
vestment based on the annualized
after-tax earnings of the contract
and on the average net contract
investment over the life of the con
tract. Additional useful information
is also printed which compares the
profit margins achieved by the sim
ulated contract performance with
the initial target (e.g., from con
tract proposal if applicable).
The logic used by the computer
program to produce this output
from the input variables supplied
duplicates, to a large extent, the
normal accounting steps employed
in determining historical balance
sheet and income statement infor
mation. For example, projected in
ventory clearances are calculated
by recognizing the expected gross
margin percentages on the contract
when sales are realized in accordJanuary-February, 1973

EXHIBIT 3
MODEL STRUCTURE FOR FIXED PRICE CONTRACT
WITH FORECASTED DATA ONLY AND
NO MAJOR CONTRACTORS

STEP I

CALCULATION OF INVENTORY CLEARANCE RATIO

ance with procedures normally used
in cost accounting. Also, the deter
mination of projected progress pay
ment billings and liquidations fol
lows closely the mechanisms used
for actually invoicing customers.
However, where actual accounting
procedures cannot be applied for
generating projections due to in
sufficiency of input data, a theo
retical approach is used. For exam
ple, in liquidating accounts receiv
able the model does not have ac
cess to actual cash receipts data.
It therefore constructs an accounts
receivable balance based on the
projected invoices issued and on
the input parameter defining the
average cash collection time lag.
The time lag can be based on ac
tual collection experiences for each
customer; also multiple time lags
can be introduced to study the re
sults under varying assumptions.
Exhibit 3 on pages 31-34 diagram
matically outlines the logical design
of the model as it would apply to
a firm fixed-price contract, without
major subcontractors. The com
puter program operates in three
consecutive steps designed to: (1)
calculate a gross margin ratio
for use in clearing inventory ac
counts upon contract shipments/
milestones; (2) calculate the monthby-month cash flow and net con
tract investment balances along
with supporting information con

cerning inventories, receivables,
payables, and progress payments;
and (3) calculate the net profit on
the contract, the average net con
tract investment, and the return on
net contract investment. In step
(1) the month-by-month input con
tract shipping/billing plan and the
initial direct cost expenditure plan
(adjusted by the input cost per
formance variables) are accumu
lated to determine the anticipated
contract revenue and contract di
rect cost. The anticipated direct
cost divided by the total sales rev
enue produces the inventory clear
ance ratio (the reciprocal of the
gross margin ratio) for the con
tract. The ratio is used in step (2)
to calculate the cost of sales related
to interim billings upon delivery
of contract items or attainment of
contract milestones.
During step (2) the program
performs the calculations necessary
to determine the various end-ofmonth working capital account
balances for the individual contract
being projected. Beginning with
the first month’s sales billed and
direct cost projections, adjusted by
the input schedule and cost per
formance variables, the program
calculates, based on input contract
terms and conditions and adminis
trative parameters, the appropriate
progress payment billing, progress
payment liquidation, and cost of
31

nued)

MODEL STRUCTURED PRICE CONTRACT
WITH FORECASTED DATA ON NO MAJOR SUBCONTRACTORS

CALCULATION OF MONTHLY CASH AND NET CONTRACT INVESTMENT

32
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EXHIBIT 3 (continued)
MODEL STRUCTURE FOR FIXED PRICE CONTRACT
WITH FORECASTED DATA ONLY AND
NO MAJOR SUBCONTRACTORS

STEP 3
CALCULATION OF NET PROFIT AND RETURN ON NET CONTRACT INVESTMENT

the beginning accounts payable
balance.
The end-of-the-month net con
tract investment balance is deter
mined by the formula, shown in
Figure 1 at the left below.
In addition, the net contract cash
flow is determined by subtracting
cumulative cash paid from cumu
lative cash received, where:
Cum. Cash
__
Cum. Sales
Received____________ Billed
Unliquidated
Prog. Payment
Balance
Cum. Cash
Paid

Accounts
— Receivable
Balance

Cum. Direct Cost
Incurred
Accounts Payable
Balance

sales. The month-end inventory
balance is determined by subtract
ing the cumulative cost of sales
from the cumulative direct cost
incurred.
The unliquidated progress pay
ment balance is determined by
subtracting cumulative progress
payment liquidations from cumula
tive progress payment billings. The
accounts receivable balance is de
termined by a function based on

the input cash collection time lag,
the sales billed during the current
and prior months, the net changes
in the unliquidated progress pay
ment balances during the current
and prior months, and the opening
accounts receivable balance, if any.
The accounts payable balance is
determined by a similar function
based on the input cash payment
lag, the direct cost incurred during
the current and prior months, and

FIGURE I
Net Contract
Cumulative
Investment
+ Direct Costs
Balance
Incurred

Cumulative
— Cost of
Sales

Unliquidated
Accts.
Progress Pay + Rec'ble.
ment Balance
Balance

Accts.
Payable
Balance

Inventory
Balance

FIGURE 2
Return on
Net
Contract
Investment

12
[Net Profit x (1 — Corp. Income Tax Rate)] x —
n
Sum of monthly contract investment balances

m

where:

Net
Profit
n

Cumulative
Sales Billed

Cum. Direct
Cost Incurred x

Rate) J

= number of months in life of contract

m = n
number of months required to liquidate accounts receivable
and payable balances after completion of contract
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After the cumulative net con
tract investment balance is up
dated, the program recycles through
step (2) for each of the remaining
months in the life of the contract.
When the calculations for the term
of the contract are completed, the
program continues for a few more
months until the accounts payable
and receivable balances are totally
liquidated based on the time lags
input to the program. After this
phase the program continues to
step (3) during which the return
on net contract investment for the
total contract is calculated using
the formula, shown in Figure 2, left.
Special routines are incorporated
in the model’s programing to ac
commodate contract incentive pro
visions, major subcontractors’ ac
tivities, and performance on letter
contracts prior to definition of unit
prices.
For incentive contracts it is nec
essary to input certain additional
information indicating the cost
sharing provisions and schedule in
centive/penalties incorporated in
the contract. Given the cost shar
ing ratio, contract ceiling price,
and incentives for early deliveries
and penalties for late deliveries,
the model calculates a “derived sell
price” for the incentive contract
which is based on the projected
direct cost and delivery schedules,
Management Adviser

and the appropriate performance
variables used in the run. The
model automatically establishes
price reserves or special receivables
accounts when customer billings,
based on target prices, do not coin
cide with sales realized, which are
based on the derived sell price of
the contract. These accounts are
then recognized in the determina
tion of net cash flow and net con
tract investment. The complex rela
tionships involved in the analysis
of multiple incentive contracts ef
fectively utilize the model’s capa
bilities for rapid and repeated cal
culations of alternatives.
The model contains a subrou
tine to simulate the activities of
major subcontractors. Resembling
closely the formulation of the main
program, the subcontractor routine
permits the introduction of per
formance variables and other in
puts related specifically to the sub
contractors’ portions of the con
tract. The payments to the subcon
tractor, as projected by the model,
are then automatically included in
the prime contractor’s direct costs,
but are identified separately for
progress billing when the contract
specifies a different rate for prog
ress billing of subcontractor pay
ments.
An important additional feature,
which was added to the model
after initial implementation, extends
the model’s usefulness beyond the
negotiation and initial planning
stages of a contract. Specifically,
by permitting the input of actual
historical data, the model can be
used during the contract perform
ance phase as a mechanism for
monitoring and evaluating contract
performance in relation to objec
tives and for updating the initial
plans. For example, if the model
were run in the fifth month after
contract go-ahead, the model would
accept as input data actual sub
sidiary account balances, taken
directly from the accounting sys
tem, for the first five months of the
run, and calculate simulated data
for the remaining months which
would be based both on the bal
ances at the end of the first five
January-February, 1973

months and on the projected input
data supplied in the manner prev
iously described. The historical in
put data for each of the first five
months would include the actual
sales billed, direct cost incurred,
cost of sales, unliquidated progress
payments, accounts receivable, and
accounts payable balances. The
model would calculate, using the
formulas given before, the net cash
flow and net contract investments
balances for the first five months
based on the historical data. In
this way, the output provides a
means for consistent comparison of
actual monthly contract cash flow
and net contract investment with
the objectives previously estab
lished by an earlier run at the out
set of the contract. Also the model
is capable of producing updated
plans for the remaining contract
period. The simulated ROI value
produced by the updated plan is
then based partially on historical
data and partially on projected
data.

The model contains a
subroutine to simulate the

activities of major
subcontractors. Resembling

closely the formulation

of the main program, the

Implementation of the model

subcontractor routine

The model’s implementation fol
lowed closely the phased develop
ment of the model. Management’s
exposure to the model began as
soon as the initial version was
operational. Prior to major contract
negotiation sessions, the model was
run with various combinations of
contemplated strategies. Armed
with alternative profit and ROI
data, the negotiators requested and
obtained access to the model for
making additional trade-off analy
ses as negotiations proceeded. The
necessary communications for this
application are now handled via
long-distance telephone conversa
tions between the negotiators and
the contract ROI model coordinator
with high priority turn-around time
of not less than a half hour. Illus
trations of the model’s use for nego
tiations are provided by Exhibits 4
and 5 on pages 36 and 37.
Exhibit 4 illustrates the results
of three iterations of the basic pro
gram for a range of different cost
performance levels. All variables

permits the introduction of

performance variables and
other inputs related

specifically to the
subcontractors’ portions

of the contract.
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EXHIBIT 4
CONTRACT NEGOTIATION PHASE
RETURN ON NET CONTRACT INVESTMENT FOR VARIED
PROGRESS PAYMENT BILLING/LIQUIDATION RATES

were held constant except progress
payment billing and liquidation
rates. Three different combinations
of rates were applied. The first, 80
per cent progress payment billing
rate and 80 per cent progress pay
ment liquidation rate, is the com
bination specified by the Armed
Services Procurement Regulations
(ASPR) on price-competitive con
tracts when profit is not specifically
negotiated. This alternative pro
duces the lowest ROI of the cases
tested for the contract proposal
studied.
The best ROI performance is
produced by the 80 per cent bill
ing and 72.8 per cent liquidation
rate combination which is currently
provided by ASPR for the appli
cable profit percentage range when
the profit is specifically negotiated.
In this way the contractor can prog
ress bill at the maximum rate al
lowable while liquidating sales at
a lower rate.
The third alternative tested, 70
per cent billing rate and 65.3 per
cent liquidation rate, produces re
sults in between the two other
36

cases. These relationships are not
universally applicable but are valid
only for the specific conditions of
the particular contract proposal
tested.
The simulation illustrated in Ex
hibit 5 was used to study the effect
on ROI of two proposed milestone
billing plans. The 80 per cent prog
ress payment billing and 72.8 per
cent progress payment liquidation
parameters were used for the same
contract proposal studied in Exhi
bit 4. The only difference between
the two curves shown in this exhi
bit is in the timing of the sales
billed plan. The total sell price
and margin are the same; however,
the customer proposal calls for
milestone payments beginning in
the eighth month of the contract,
whereas the contractor plan calls
for payments beginning in the third
month. The contractor plan pro
vides superior ROI potential.
Upon completion of successful
contract negotiations, the computer
model is used to test alternative
contract performance plans. Vary
ing project management and ad

ministrative options are analyzed
and evaluated for their contribu
tion to improved ROI. Exhibits 6
and 7 on pages 37 and 38 illustrate
two applications of the model dur
ing the contract planning phase.
In Exhibit 6 the effect on ROI
of various combinations of cost and
schedule are studied on a fixedprice incentive contract incorpor
ating a 15 per cent incentive share
ratio and a delivery incentive/penalty of one per cent of total cost
per monthly deviation in schedule
allowing for a 30-day grace period.
As an example, the graph indicates
the following trade-off useful in
planning contract performance: an
over-run in direct costs of not
more than 4 per cent would be
preferable to allowing a two-month
slippage in delivery schedule.
Exhibit 7 demonstrates the im
portance of rapid cash collection.
Four cases were tested, with all
contract variables held constant ex
cept the average cash collection
period, which was varied from one
quarter month to one full month.
Through repeated analyses of this
type on numerous contracts, the
advantages of a more rapid cash
turnover policy were clearly ex
pressed. As a result, it became
common practice to invoice cus
tomers for progress payments on
a weekly basis rather than monthly.
This significantly reduced the ag
gregate investment in contract in
ventory.
With the incorporation of the
historical input data capability
previously discussed, the model
was implemented for use in man
agement control over contract per
formance. For all major contracts,
curves showing contract investment
and contract cash flow analysis are
maintained for ABC’s product-line
managers and for respective pro
gram managers. In addition, up
dated plans are executed when they
become necessary due to significant
changes in the assumptions incor
porated in the original plans. In
those cases, it is customary to main
tain the performance curves both
for the original objectives and for
the updated plans.
Management Adviser

Several refinements and expan
sions in the concepts and tech
niques used in the design and ap
plication of the model have been
considered, some of which are con
templated for future implementa
tion. One conceptual shortcoming
in the model’s method of calculat
ing average net contract investment
is the failure to give recognition to
the time-related cost of funding the
incremental investment in working
capital required by the contract
under consideration. Due to this
omission, proper recognition is not
given to the “time value of money”
in computing the return on net
contract investment. For example,
two contracts with the same net
profits and average net contract in
vestments will yield, based on the
model’s present formulas, the same
ROI values even though the timephased distribution of the working
capital requirements might be en
tirely different in the two cases. In
reality, the time-related cost of
funding a heavy working capital
investment early in the life of a
contract is greater than the cost for
the corresponding requirement later
on in a contract, even though the
average contract investment hap
pens to be equal on both contracts.
In order to incorporate this concept
in the ROI calculation in the
model, it would be necessary to
discount the monthly net contract
investment balances using a rate
of discount which reflects the com
pany’s cost of capital for short-term
financing. Using the discounted
present value of the net contract
investment balance, in place of the
simple monthly average, would
restate the ROI on a basis which
consistently includes the time-ori
ented cost of funding the working
capital investment. Given the ap
propriate rate of discount as input,
the computer model could be re
programed to handle the required
calculations automatically.
Another area for possible im
provement of the model would be
the introduction of probabilistic
factors to quantify the relative risks
associated with various alternatives.
The inclusion of performance variJanuary-February, 1973

EXHIBIT 5
CONTRACT NEGOTIATION PHASE
RETURN ON NET CONTRACT INVESTMENT
CONTRACTOR PROPOSED SALES BILLED PLAN
VS CUSTOMER PROPOSED SALES BILLED PLAN

EXHIBIT 6
CONTRACT PLANNING PHASE

RETURN ON NET CONTRACT INVESTMENT
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EXHIBIT 7
CONTRACT PLANNING PHASE
RETURN ON NET CONTRACT INVESTMENT

element of working capital could
be obtained. These forecasts would
be useful in budgeting and over
head rate development, in cash
flow analyses, and in profit plan
ning. An integrated approach would
not only reduce much of the cleri
cal burden now required by these
independent exercises, but, more
significantly, would enhance the
consistency and substance of finan
cial projections and control mech
anisms employed throughout the
organization.
Conclusion

ables in the model’s input and the
current practice of generating out
put values for a range of perform
ance variables are, to a degree,
responsive to the uncertainty in
herent in contract negotiation and
performance. However, the current
methods require that each user, in
examining the output of the model,
apply his own subjective opin
ion regarding the likelihood of oc
currence for each alternative. This
hinders consistent decision making
in that each user exercises his
judgment independently of other
users and of the judgments which
accompanied the input data. The
inclusion of probabilities in the
model’s calculations would specify
the risk assumptions to be applied
and would tend to simplify the
interpretation of the model’s out
put. One possible approach would
be to assign compound probability
values to each alternate cost and
schedule projection which would
be used by the model to construct
a probabilistic composite projection
for each contract based on the ex
pected values of each of the alter
natives tested. These input com
pound probability values would as
sume the likelihood that the con
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tractor would win the negotiation
under the proposed conditions, and
the conditional probability that,
given the award of the contract,
the projected contract performance
will in fact be achieved. When the
model is run subsequent to con
tract negotiation, the conditional
nature of the probability is natur
ally eliminated. Although this tech
nique would unify the model’s
output into one projection based
on a specified probability designa
tion, it would rely totally on the
experience and judgment of those
responsible for data input.
Numerous possibilities exist for
widening the scope of the model.
For example, the model’s present
design which accommodates only
fixed-price and fixed-price incen
tive contracts could, through rela
tively minor modifications in the
program’s equations, be expanded
to apply to cost-type contracts as
well. A more challenging and po
tentially rewarding area for model
expansion is that of integrating it
with higher-level, corporate-wide
planning models. By consolidating
the simulations run for individual
contracts, aggregate forecasts of
sales billed, cost incurred, and each

The development and imple
mentation of the contract ROI
model demonstrates an effective
application of computerized finan
cial modeling techniques in assist
ing middle management in recur
ring and operations-oriented deci
sion making. The model’s value is
clearly realized in assisting contract
negotiators to recognize and obtain
favorable contract terms and con
ditions, in assisting program man
agers to plan and manage their
programs for maximum ROI, and
in assisting product line managers
to respond to their delegated re
sponsibility for ROI management.
The introduction of the modeling
technique also served as an effec
tive vehicle for management educa
tion and training. Groups from man
agement, heretofore unconcerned
with ROI concepts in meeting their
day-to-day responsibilities, were di
rectly confronted with the impor
tance of investment management
as it relates to normal operating
decisions which come under their
control. The model’s success in this
regard is largely a result of the
approach taken throughout its de
velopment and implementation—
i.e., addressing and involving a
wide spectrum of management in
the development, application, and
understanding of the modeling ap
proach. By avoiding the “ivory
tower,” analytical staff approach,
top management was ably assisted
in disseminating its policies and
objectives throughout the organi
zation.
Management Adviser

Work measurement techniques are often touted as
the universal panacea for a company's ills. Actually
they are only one aspect—and not necessarily the
most important aspect—of a three-pronged program
to improve worker effectiveness—

WORK MEASUREMENT ALONE
IS NOT THE ANSWER
by Carl H. Poedtke, Jr.
Price Waterhouse & Co.

this article deals pri
Many companies have turned to
marily with the improvement
work measurement programs in an
of clerical operations, many of the effort to solve this problem. Why
concepts presented are equally ap
did they turn, almost instinctively,
plicable to indirect labor areas,
to work measurement to cure their
such as materials handling, equip
ills? This has occurred for several
ment maintenance, and stock keep
reasons:
ing. These concepts would be gen
1. Management sees its problem
erally applicable to both large and
as being one of productivity —
small departments and in practi
output per man-hour; not one of
cally all types of businesses.
effectiveness—good systems imple
There is a general need through
mented with adequate training.
out industry to improve the pro
2. Work measurement carries the
ductivity and effectiveness of both
connotation that “then we will
clerical and indirect labor. It often
know how much a fair day’s work
seems that this is one of those
is . . .’’—in other words, an imper
Situations like the weather; that is,
sonal “golden yardstick.”
everyone talks about it and no one
3. Work measurement, in itself,
does anything about it. For some
does not deal directly with changes
time, it has been estimated that if
in systems and procedures and
the productivity of clerical groups
therefore “will not rock the boat.”
Were measured against realistic and
attainable labor standards, it would
Reviews of the manpower con
reveal a national efficiency of some
trol programs of a number of com
thing less than 60 per cent; some
panies have indicated a wide vari
persons go as far as to say that
ation in clerical work measurement
this would be closer to 40 per cent.
programs from company to com

A

lthough
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pany. Some companies use stand
ards that amount to “best guesses,”
while others apply standards de
veloped from detailed predeter
mined time systems. Some employ
standard data developed for gen
eral clerical functions; others de
velop standard data from stopwatch
studies of company personnel. One
general conclusion can be drawn—
WORK MEASUREMENT ALONE
IS NOT THE ANSWER to their
problem.
Work measurement alone, with
out the support of other improve
ments, is not really a potent tool
for improving either the effective
ness or the productivity of clerical
operations. Too often, poorly en
gineered standards have been es
tablished for inefficient procedures,
with resulting control reports dis
regarded by untrained supervisory
personnel. The result in such a
situation is obviously wasted mo
tion and a wasted initial invest
ment. In addition, these inadequa39

Poorly engineered standards, established for inefficient procedures, result in
control reports disregarded by untrained supervisory personnel.

If any of the three elements
required to develop and
implement lasting improve

cies are obvious to all affected
employees, and tend to impair the
credibility of future improvement
programs, even those which are
soundly conceived and executed.
Work measurement is a useful
tool, but it is not a tool that can
be used alone as effectively as it
could be as part of a more com
prehensive program.

ment in clerical operations is
lacking, the program will

never attain the benefits
which might otherwise be

obtainable. The three prongs

are supervisory training,

systems analysis, and work
measurement.

A proven approach

Experience has shown that a
“three-pronged program” is required
to develop and implement lasting
improvements in clerical opera
tions. If any of these three elements
is lacking, the program will never
attain the benefits which otherwise
might be possible. The three prongs
are supervisory training, systems
analysis, and work measurement.
Within each prong there are a
number of working tools available.
When these elements are intelli
gently blended, an effective pro
gram results.
This is not an abstract or theo
retical program. Some of the areas
in which this three-pronged apCARL H. POEDTKE, Jr.,
is a principal in the
New
York
office
of
Price Waterhouse & Co.
Previously he was a
manager of value engi
neering at Chicago Raw
hide Manufacturing Co.
Mr. Poedtke is a mem
ber of the American In
stitute of Industrial Engineers and also par
ticipates in the Chamber of Commerce of
the Borough of Queens and the Massachu
setts Institute of Technology's Alumni Cen
ter of New York.
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proach has been applied success
fully include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Order processing
Accounts payable
Billing and accounts receivable
Stockrooms
Engineering drafting
Purchasing
Maintenance.

Some of the most successful
“three-pronged programs” have
been launched through a “team”
effort. Typically, a team is made
up of consultants, to provide tech
nical guidance, and company per
sonnel, who understand the com
pany and are familiar with the
operations of the areas involved.
An effective team should be able
to attain results with a minimum
of disruption. This team approach
also provides the company with a
group of trained personnel who
are capable of administering the
program on an ongoing basis.
Supervisory training

The term “supervisory training”
tends to create a mental picture of
men and women sitting in a class
room and listening to some learned
instructor—or maybe even a learned
consultant — expound on manage
ment theory. They even may be
working on case studies, as in a
business school environment. In
terms of imparting a general man
agement viewpoint, this type of
training can be useful. However,
in relation to improvement of cler
ical operations, the type of train
ing that is needed is a pragmatic
Management Adviser

Very basic systems analysis can be applied in the context of an effective clerical work improve
ment pattern: analysis of work flow, forms, and manual procedures.

program with objectives that are
concrete improvements in clerical
effectiveness and productivity. In
short, such improvement requires a
departure from traditional training
techniques.
One new approach that has had
excellent results is a simulation of
management activities through the
vehicle of MINICOST, a copy
righted computer software pack
age of Continental Illinois National
Bank & Trust Company of Chi
cago. This package allows persons
participating in the program to see
the cost results of their simulated
management decisions the day after
they are made. The purpose of
MINICOST is to show the super
visor that his decisions affect costs
and that planning and effective
use of control information allow
him to minimize costs.
Systems analysis

The second prong of an effective
program is systems analysis. This
term also tends to conjure up im
ages. The most common one is that
of a starry-eyed computer techni
cian drawing flow charts and writ
ing computer programs. In the
context of an effective clerical work
improvement program, very basic
systems analysis can be applied—
that is, analysis of work flow, forms,
and manual procedures—to deter
mine if the methods being used
are those which should continue to
be used and should have standards
developed for them, or whether bas
ic procedural changes are needed
prior to setting standards. In con
junction with this, work sampling
techniques frequently are applied
January-February, 1973

to develop information about the
activities performed and the rela
tive amount of time devoted to
them. This approach assures that
standards will not be established
for inefficient methods. Quite often,
the most significant cost reductions
in a clerical improvement program
result not from the installation of
standards, but through the im
provement of the systems being
used.
Work measurement

After the establishment of an
effective supervisory training pro
gram and after performing adequate
systems analysis, the question of
work measurement for use in plan
ning and control should be ad
dressed. Frequently, the simplest
system or technique is the best.
This is extremely important because
of the significant effort and attend
ant expense required in a good
program for maintenance of stand
ards. In general, the development
of “super precise” standards for all
clerical functions would be folly
both from the standpoint of believ
ing that such precision could be

attained in the clerical area and
because of the Herculean task of
attempting to maintain such stand
ards. Further, it is not necessary
to establish all standards through
the use of a single system. There
fore, more precise standards can
be established for more important
operations, and less costly and
somewhat less precise techniques
used for less important operations.
Price Waterhouse & Co. has
been working for several years with
a predetermined time system called
MODAPTS. It is so simple that it
can be easily committed to mem
ory. Application has proven it to
be an accurate and consistent sys
tem in both factory and clerical
environments. In some cases, MO
DAPTS permits the development
of standard data which results in
minimizing the cost of establishing
and maintaining standards. Work
sampling frequently is used to
develop economical and reliable
standards. In some cases, applicable
standard data already may be avail
able and could provide the most
effective and economical standards
for the particular situation.
Regardless of the work measure-

In general, the development of "super precise" standards for all clerical
functions would be folly.
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PRODUCTIVITY

Line management must be provided with accurate and timely reports high
lighting efficiency and productivity. Without feedback, work standards be
come meaningless.

It is possible to perform

supervisory training, systems
analysis, or work measure

ment alone. Each by itself
would probably have some

positive effect. However, a

clerical improvement
program must be geared to

quickly obtaining benefits

ment technique employed, feed
back is always one of the most im
portant ingredients in effectively
using labor standards. Line man
agement must be provided with
accurate and timely reports high
lighting efficiency and productivity.
These reports should be designed
in conjunction with users to ensure
that information is presented in
the form most useful to them in
validating the reliability of stand
ards and in identifying and solving
problems. Without accurate and
timely feedback, work standards
become meaningless and a mana
gerial burden rather than a man
agement tool.

of a clerical improvement program
are dependent upon the specific
conditions which exist. The im
portant thing is to maximize the
benefits of the program. To do this,
properly applied supportive tech
niques, such as “Short Interval
Scheduling,” or administrative ac
tions, such as freezing personnel
requisitions, may be required. As
in the implementation of any pro
gram, this is the phase which tests
management’s will and its desire
to achieve beneficial change. Here,
managerial achievers are separated
from “also rans.”

Implementation

It is possible to perform super
visory training, systems analysis, or
work measurement alone. Each by
itself would probably have some
positive effect. However, a clerical
improvement program must be
geared to quickly obtaining bene
fits which will be lasting. Manage
ment does not want to be in the
position of reducing positions to
day only to see them creep back
into operations six months from
now. This “three-pronged program”
works; it is a way to attain lasting
improvements, rather than “oneshot” reductions. Experience has
shown that trained supervisors
managing good systems can effec
tively apply work measurement on
an ongoing basis and thereby pro
vide a company with timely ser
vices at an optimum cost level.

which will he lasting.
Of course, the requirements re
lating to the actual implementation

Management does not want to be in
the position of reducing positions to
day only to see them reappear in
six months.
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Conclusion
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Accountants, always recorders of what has happened,
must become forecasters of the future, this author
believes, citing measures they can take to prepare
themselves for this new role—

ACCOUNTING MYOPIA
by C. W. Lee
Domingues Hills State College

As the title of this article indi
ago Theodore Levitt,
cates, it is my thesis that account
professor of marketing at the
Harvard Business School, introing in general—and management
accounting in particular—views its
duced the term “marketing myopia”
function as far too narrow to play
to describe businesses and indus
a key role in top management de
tries that view their market as too
cisions of the future. Is the pur
narrowly defined or constrained.1
pose of accounting only to main
Such tendencies prohibit dynamic
tain records of the past for his
adjustment to rapidly changing
torically oriented inquiry (that is,
conditions. He pointed out that for
running trains) or is it also to an
a long time railroads viewed their
ticipate and furnish information
function as running trains, not pro
directed toward future problem
viding transportation. Only when
decision areas (providing transpor
the aim of providing transportation
tation) that top management must
began to replace the aim of running
trains did the railroad industry re
resolve?
The railroads are still running
verse its deteriorating position.
trains even though that’s not where
the action is. Accountants will con
1 Levitt, Theodore, “Marketing Myopia,”
tinue to keep the books, in better
Harvard Business Review, July-August,
and better wavs, providing faster
1960.

A

decade
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and more detailed reports, and
utilizing the wonders of computer
technology. I do not foresee the
discontinuance of any accounting
functions. They all serve a valid
purpose. But, the responsibility for
these increasingly routine account
ing functions (external reporting,
internal monitoring, etc.) isn’t
where the action is cither—at least
from top management’s point of
view.
Decision-making needs

Accounting must continue to pre
pare balance sheets and operating
statements for stockholders, the
SEC, regulatory bodies, the IRS,
and others. Expenses must con
tinue to be monitored and con-
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The accountant who visualizes himself as merely a recorder ... is going to be parochial.

trolled against logically selected
targets. Costs must be collected,
aggregated, allocated, and summar
ized in meaningful ways for makeor-buy decisions, special order
pricing, capital investment ranking,
etc. The price and wage control
system now in effect places re
newed emphasis on cost accounting.
Looking ahead, though, top man
agement is going to be far more
concerned with other decision mak
ing needs. Each of these needs will
be key parts of tomorrow’s man
agement information system. I do
not mean any particular manage
ment information system or sub
system, but rather that whole col
lection of sources and reports from
which top management regularly
draws its data, recommendations,
and inspiration for decision mak
ing. The accountant is only one of
the inputs, but the value of his
information in the future (and,
hence, his value as a member of
the management team) will depend
largely on whether it addresses
management’s needs in a meaning
ful way.
This idea of becoming more sen
sitive and receptive to what is go
ing on in the world in which the
company exists is more a matter of

The accountant who views his
function in the narrowest sense
is in the same position as yester
day's outmoded railroad man.
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rethinking attitudes than anything
else. The accountant who visual
izes himself as merely a recorder
of what has already happened is
going to be parochial. The account
ant who wishes to increase his
value as an adviser to management
will read the daily paper thoroughly
rather than limiting himself to the
business section, will lunch from
time to time with non-financial
business colleagues, and will sit
back occasionally and stare hard
into the future—only in such ways
can he ascertain the problems man
agement will face in the future.

Emerging trends

In addition to all the information
management has always needed in
order to guide the enterprise, there
is an increasing and as yet rela
tively unmet need for the following:
(1) Marketing-oriented informa
tion, both in contrast and in addi
tion to manufacturing-oriented in
formation.
(2) Externally, as well as inter
nally, focused information. (Ex
ternal being outside the firm.)
(3) Intangible things must be
described, reported on, monitored,
charted, and analyzed—as well as
the traditional and tangible items
such as dollars, gallons, hours, etc.
(4) Predictions and forecasts
must be made about the significant
factors in the organization’s en
vironment.
(5) Relevance, as traded-off
against precision, objectivity, and
verifiability, will be the key meth
odological consideration associated
with the previous four items.

These five are not mutually ex
clusive. In fact, they are so inter
related one could argue against
their separation, and for treatment
of them collectively as applied to
some other scheme (such as cus
tomers, competitors, government,

etc.). Nevertheless, I feel the points
are best understood if presented
in this manner.
Before discussing these five con
cepts, let me suggest that if they
“aren’t accounting” to you, perhaps
you are figuratively a descendant
of the railroad executives of two
generations ago who felt that own
ing and operating trucks in sparsely
populated areas “wasn’t railroad
ing” either.
Marketing information

In the early days of the indus
trial revolution, business problems
and emphasis were related to pro
duction. Consumption and sales
took care of themselves. Times have
changed, and the difficulties of
mass production have been largely
overshadowed by the problems and
complexities of mass distribution.
Accounting is still primarily ori
ented toward manufacturing,2 and
secondarily toward distribution. Al
though the manufacturer may see
distribution as only 10 to 20 per
cent of his cost, it represents about
half the final selling price [to the
consumer].3
Who provides vital information

Top management must decide
how many warehouses to establish,
where, and what type of transpor
tation to provide from factory, via
various intermediate locations, to
ultimate customer. Problems of cost
control in these areas of storage
and transportation have yielded to
sophisticated analytical techniques.
But, it’s not usually accounting de
partment personnel that provide
this vital information to the key
decision makers.
2 Horngren, Charles T., “The Accounting
Discipline in 1999,” The Accounting Re
view, January, 1971, p. 7.
3 McCarthy, E. Jerome, Basic Marketing
—A Managerial Approach, Homewood,
Ill., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968, p. 2.
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Any attempt to broaden his outlook will aid the accountant who wishes to
increase his value to management. A thorough reading of the daily paper,
not just the business pages, is invaluable as are frequent meetings with non
financial people.

If one prepares a graph having
price on the vertical axis and quan
tity demanded on the horizontal
axis, the economist’s classic demand
curve, where demand rises as price
decreases, emerges. This curve has
nothing to do with costs, only with
the amount of a product that the
public will buy at any given price.
The rate of change of demand com
pared to the rate of change of price
is termed price “elasticity.” In pric
ing decisions top management cer
tainly needs some cost information,
such as the accountant has always
provided; however, in addition, de
mand curve information or assump
tions will be used, either implicitly
or explicitly, in setting prices. Both
subjective estimates by sales per
sonnel and pilot testing by market
research staffs can provide useful
approximations of the demand
curve. The source of management
information that regularly incorpo
rates demand curve data and con
siderations into its reports and recC. W. LEE is assistant
professor of business ad
ministration at Domin
gues Hills State College
in the Los Angeles area.
Previously he served as
special studies manager
for TRW Systems, vice
president of Non-Linear
Systems, financial vice
president of Electralab Electronics, and an in
dependent consultant. Mr. Lee received his
A.B. from the University of California at
Berkeley, his M.B.A. from the Harvard Business
School, and is presently completing his doc
toral studies at the University of Southern
California.
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ommendations will be more highly
regarded by top management than
those sources that omit it.
The export sales desk became the
export department, and then be
came the international division.
Now the distinction of national
boundaries is beginning to dimin
ish, and companies describe them
selves as “multinational.” But the
legal and procedural complexities
of marketing in a number of coun
tries remain. Advertising regula
tions, warranty practices, packag
ing requirements, and consumer
buying habits all vary from country
to country, and someone must pro
vide the necessary inputs for deci
sions related to such marketing con
siderations. To the extent the ac
countant is cognizant of these fac
tors, and relates their implications
in a meaningful way to top man
agement, he is allowing the ac
counting department to expand its
horizons as the company grows
across national borders.
Clearly, top management must
have a good source of marketingoriented information. If the ac
countant merely suggests the sales
director’s staff, or the market re
search department, he is allowing
an excellent opportunity to slip
away. On the other hand, if the
accountant develops the necessary
familiarity with the concepts in
volved, he will then be a better
source of management information,
and more completely fulfill his re
sponsibilities.

The idea of becoming more
sensitive and receptive to
what is going on in the world

in which the company exists
is more a matter of rethinking

attitudes than anything else.
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Management must decide how many warehouses to establish, where, and what
type of transportation to provide from factory via intermediate locations to
ultimate consumer. But it's usually not accounting department personnel that
provide the needed information to decision makers.

From the accountant’s perspec
tive, information has flowed within
the firm, and from the firm to the
outside, via the various reports he
prepares for the readers and requir
ers of the traditional financial and
operating reports. In this day and
age, however, top management
must not only shift its focus from
factory operations to marketing ac
tivities, but must also more closely
monitor its external environment.
What legislation is being consid
ered somewhere that may affect the
company? Who is in favor of it?
Who is against it? How can it be
affected if the firm wants to lobby
for or against it? What vacancies
are expected on which regulatory
bodies, and what are the biases of
the person(s) who recommends the
appointment, or confirms it? The
whole government sector is one
which must be constantly analyzed
46

for its impending impact on the
firm.
What are the values and atti
tudes of the various union and eth
nic groups which are part of the
firm’s environment? What causes
are they pursuing on other fronts?
What do they perceive as their
problem with our company/indus
try/region? What is their strategy
to correct the problems they per
ceive? How do we measure up on
their criterion. This is a time in
history when various minority
groups are becoming aware of their
power, and how to wield it. Top
management must be kept well in
formed of these facts—even the un
pleasant ones it doesn’t want to hear
—and the behavioral implications it
must consider.
The whole consumer world is
changing. People travel further to
shop; they usually work in a dif

ferent town from the one they live
in. Evening and weekend store
hours are becoming the rule, not
the exception. To make intelligent
marketing channel decisions top
management must monitor these
changing living habits of the pop
ulation.
The accountant, of course, can
opt to ignore the world outside the
firm, and leave such external con
cerns to others. It probably doesn’t
make much difference to top man
agement. The president is more
concerned with having the informa
tion when he needs it, in a useable
form, than with the title of his
trusted adviser.
The past has become a decreas
ingly useful guide to the future.
The rate of change is increasing.4
The “relevant range” within which
curvilinear relationships could be,
for practical purposes, treated as
linear, has narrowed. Who would
have predicted in 1963—a mere ten
years ago—and considered it in his
planning that within five years the
military would be called out in
several major cities in this country
to control rioting so extensive that
in some countries it would have
been called revolution? It hap
pened in 1965, 1966, 1967. What
other generally unexpected events
will happen in 1975, 1976, 1977?
Who would have predicted three
years ago that we would have wage
and price controls by 1971? Recall
the shock and surprise that the an
nouncement of President Nixon’s
trip to China caused. And yet,
thoughtful men who study current
trends with open minds and a mod
est amount of imagination had con
sidered these events and, where
appropriate, incorporated them into
their plans.
With the emergence of multiple
ownership of business, the corpo
ration form developed, with a
board of directors to represent the
stockholders. It has been fashion
able at times to have highly re
spected members of society serve
on these boards, but their legal and
4 Toffler, Alvin, Future Shock, New York,
Bantam Books, 1970, chapters 2 and 3 es
pecially.
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generally accepted role was to
bring their good judgment and rep
utation to work for the benefit of
the stockholders. If we look at
other countries, however, we see
members of boards of directors
whose legal obligation is to repre
sent one or more trade unions, or
the government, or the public. In
this country we hear Ralph Nader
make charges of corporate irre
sponsibility because boards of di
rectors represent only the owners.
Does the possibility (probability?)
of stockholders having only minor
ity positions on boards of directors
have any implications for top man
agement? You bet it does. Infor
mation must be provided on such
trends, probabilities, implications,
and possible strategies.
Who will provide it?
The original right of an employer
to terminate an employee’s services
has been steadily modified. The
circumstances, conditions, and pen
alties under which such services
may be terminated have become
narrowly defined. However, the
right to reduce the work force in
total, due solely to a lack of work,
is still available (even if the
amount of notice required, and the
determination of which specific em
ployees are to be laid off, are sub
ject to outside control). If one
again studies other countries, and
listens to social critics, one could
easily foresee the day when layoffs
require lengthy government hear
ings. Perhaps firms will be required
to retain unneeded workers on the
payroll, put them to work doing
community services (leaf raking?),
and receive a partial subsidy from
the Government to offset the loss.
Such a scheme might be seen as
better than welfare and unemploy
ment insurance. Top management
will keep itself informed of such
possibilities from a variety of
sources. If the accountant is one
of those sources, one which reg
ularly looks ahead and spots trends
and pressure points, he will be re
lied on increasingly, thus enhanc
ing his power and prestige.
Consumer movements have come
and gone. Mining and other indus
trial tragedies frequently start a cry
January-February, 1973

for safety legislation. The increas
ing interest in the courts and legis
lative halls in warranties—both ex
plicit and implied—points toward
action in that quarter. The future
holds unknown penalties for the
company which fails to project the
moods of the public into the future.
The accountant must regularly
question the often present and usu
ally implicit assumption that the
future will be pretty much like the
past. It is not enough for the ac
countant to make his assumptions
explicitly; he must suggest alterna
tive assumptions and assess their
probability. Using these alternative
assumptions, he must predict vari
ous futures, and study their impli
cations for his firm.

haps attract the anti-pollution
group’s attention? Could such a
group be convinced that the visible
steam vapor is better than the in
visible but harmful particles dis
charged before? Should the firm sit
tight and defer the smokestack
filter installation until pressured to
do so?
Or suppose top management
must decide whether to recall X
thousand widgets that might have
defective insulation. Announcing
the recall could hurt the company’s
image—or help it—whereas the cost
of not recalling depends on several
hard-to-estimate, but nevertheless
real, factors.
The aware accountant—the one
who consciously “sensitized” him
self to his climate—brings certain

Intangible information

The accountant can readily com
pute the return on investment on a
new punchpress, making reasonable
assumptions about cost, savings of
direct labor and material, power
consumption, etc. But what can the
accountant do in less tangible, less
quantifiable areas? Top manage
ment continues to make decisions
about intangible subjects, whether
the accountant participates or not.
For example, suppose the firm is
considering the installation of a
smokestack filter which would re
move all of the harmful but invis
ible particles now entering the air.
However, the new filter discharges
harmless but visible steam vapor
into the air. The company has had
reasonably good relations with the
community, but a local concern
over pollution has been voiced.
Will the harmless steam vapor per

The accountant, of course, can opt to ignore the world outside the firm and
leave external concerns to others. It won't make much difference to top man
agement. The president is more concerned with having the information when
he needs it than with the title of his top adviser.
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tured the flavor of new problem
areas to attack and overcome:

Harmless steam vapor may cause pollution concern, while invisible but
harmful emissions arouse no interest. What should a factory do?

rare advantages to his role as an
adviser. He is the one person close
to management best equipped to
deal in quantitative terms with the
net effects of any probability. He
can make the most reasonable pre
dictions of what it will cost the
company if the smokestack filters
are installed and the public reacts
against the highly visible vapor . . .
or what it will cost if they are in
stalled after a vigorous public re
lations campaign to explain the rea
sons for their installation . . . and
what it will cost the company if
the widgets are recalled, or what
it will cost if they are not recalled
and then prove to be defective.
The whole area of advertising
and promotion budget effectiveness
is filled with the need for intangible
data and judgments. Should the
company ads include pictures of
ethnic minorities in order to ap
peal to one market segment, or is
the risk of offending another mar
ket segment too great?
Top management has informa
tion needs in such instances, and
these needs will be met, even if
inadequately, by someone. If the
accountant can offer a recommen
dation based on similar problems
elsewhere, community attitudes to
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ward the company, legal opinions,
etc., then he will be a more valued
member of the team. To the extent
he abstains because there is noth
ing in the general ledger or gen
erally accepted accounting prin
ciples to support a position, he fur
ther abdicates his former role of
chief adviser to the president.
Relevant information

Top management would rather
be approximately right than exactly
wrong. The previous four types of
information, by their very nature,
by and large defy precise and
timely quantification. But top man
agement demands such informa
tion, and will get it somewhere. If
the accountant wants to be a highly
valued member of the top manage
ment team, he must concentrate on
useful approximations now for the
boss and accurate reports, after the
fact, for the tax collector, the stock
holder, and the Price Commission.
Summary

One of the ideologists of Amer
ican business has stated quite suc
cinctly the changes that are hap
pening in our society, and has cap

Moreover, there is today a va
riety of new issues forcing the
molding of a new charter for
the organization of America’s
system for producing goods
and services; vaguely and hes
itantly, in response to the is
sues, the community is draw
ing up this charter. The new
issues are most different in
their philosophical ingredients
from those which have gone
before. All of them strike at
the very vitals of the old ide
ology—at the old idea of in
dividualism, the old idea of
property rights, the old idea of
competition, the old idea of the
limited, weak state, at all the
many myths that go with these
notions, and at the structures
which these old ideas and
myths have upheld. The new
issues relate to such matters as
justice and injustice, manage
ment of human and material
resources, political power, cul
ture, the relations between in
dividuals and society.5

In the distant past top manage
ment obtained its information first
hand. With growth of the business
and increased complexity, the ac
countant then became the chief in
formation provider. But as new in
formation needs have come along,
the accountant has failed to re
spond. Management has turned to
others to meet its pressing needs,
leaving the accountants to provide
the routine data.
The opportunity is present for
the accountant to redefine his role,
and to become once again man
agement’s prime information source.
To do this he must shift his em
phasis from manufacturing to mar
keting, from internal events to
external ones, from the past to the
future, and from tangible to in
tangible concepts and values. To
accomplish this he must learn to
make more realistic trade-offs be
tween relevance and precision.
5 Lodge, George C., writing in Harvard
Today, March, 1972, p. 6.
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Communications is a perennial business problem
and it’s usually at its worst in a vast company with
interests in many nations. Here’s the story of how
one such giant, ITT, has simplified the problem—

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES:
GETTING OUT THE WORD
by Robert I. Stevens
ITT Corporation

to form multiprod
uct companies, which are some
times successful, sometimes not,
many reasons have been advanced
for the frequent disappointments or
downright collapse of some of these
ambitious projects.
There are many possible reasons
for a combination of companies in
disparate fields to fail when placed
under a single control. Often fail
ure results from personality clashes,
from union of the wrong groups of
companies, from differences in man
agement philosophies which prove
irreconcilable.
Yet almost equally often, failure
can stem from something much
n the rush

I
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simpler, a basic breakdown in
communication, the lack of a com
mon language throughout the or
ganization.
One of the most notorious bank
ruptcies in the last several years
occurred when two major transpor
tation companies merged, only to
discover after the merger that each
used a different computer system
and that the two systems were com
pletely incompatible, that the op
erating head of the merged trans
portation company had no inten
tion of moving to its headquarters’
city, and that workers in the com
pany had so little knowledge of
each other’s operations and routes

that they literally got in each other’s
way in getting their jobs done.
These were not the only reason
for the giant’s ultimate collapse and
bankruptcy but they were major
ones—and they all could have been
avoided with a little forethought.
The company in which I am em
ployed, International Telephone &
Telegraph Corp., is much larger
than the transportation complex,
vast though that was. ITT has op
erations in all parts of the world in
stead of solely in the United States.
It has many more employees,
400,000 of them in more than 300
profit centers spread over more
than 80 countries, yet in spite of
all the apparent difficulty of co49

Workers in each of the merged companies had so little knowledge of each other's . . .

ordinating activities in such a com
pany, use of properly developed
basic systems management concepts
has made the procedural aspects
of the communications job appear
to be almost routine.
The Organization Administration
Department located in ITT World
Headquarters in New York City
has responsibility for the develop
ing, coordinating, and issuing of
ITT’s basic management guide
lines. These guidelines are pub
lished in the ITT Policy Guide as
either a short, concise policy of no
more than one or two pages or as
a more detailed procedural stan
dard practice. The Policy Guide
has worldwide application and is
distributed to approximately 1,500
management personnel of the com
pany. English is used as the lan
guage of management and words
and phrases are precisely defined
in a separate lexicon. Use of slang,
provincialisms, and Americanized
expressions are avoided. Much of
the policy is of a “blocked out”
type giving the overall parameters
and letting each local unit expand
local policy to meet its needs with
in this framework.
Now, obviously, a company en
gaged in international operations
ROBERT I. STEVENS is
director-organization ad
ministration of ITT Cor
poration. Previously he
held the posts of inter
nal consultant to the Na
tional Broadcasting Co.
and manager-administra
tion, product planning,
and systems programing
for Sperry Rand Univac. Mr. Stevens received
his baccalaureate from Rutgers and did
graduate work at New York University. He
is past president of the New York chapter
of the Association of Systems Management.
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and employing 400,000 workers
can’t issue all its operating instruc
tions in English. English—and pre
cisely defined English at that—is
the language of management in
every country in the world. Oper
ating instructions at workers’ lev
els are couched in the native lan
guage. And at the management
level, which presumably will guide
and direct the workers, there is no
ambiguity about what is wanted
and what is expected.
This also means that executives
at the management level in differ
ent countries can correspond, and
each will know precisely what the
other means. The same term always
means the same thing in every
country in the world. As a matter
of fact, the only serious difficulty
we have ever had came when a
foreign executive tried to create an
English word to describe a situa
tion new to his experience. He used
the exact reverse of an English
phrase we did have in the lexicon
and came up with an English ex
pression better suited to a farm
than a business concern.
By and large the lexicon has
served us well, establishing a sort
of lingua franca that permits our
executives in any part of the world
to communicate readily with each
other in perfect confidence that
there will be no misunderstanding
anywhere along the line.
All policies and standard prac
tices for the entire company arc
contained in a four-inch binder.
The capability to file such an openend subject in such a small binder
is made possible by being very se
lective as to what is contained in
the Guide. When detailed informa

tion is required for a specific func
tional area such as Personnel, Re
search and Development, Finance,
Industrial Relations, Purchasing,
etc., it is issued as a separate pub
lication and distributed to the peo
ple whose special job functions re
quire such information. At present,
32 functional manuals are in ex
istence (see exhibit, “ITT’s Family
of Manuals,” pages 52-53). The use
of functional manuals keeps the Pol
icy Guide from becoming a “fivefoot reference” and allows a spe
cialized distribution for each sep
arate subject in addition to the dis
tribution of the Policy Gude. The
functional manuals vary from 30
pages to over five inches of ma
terial with distribution ranging
from 80 to 1,500 copies.
In addition, an ITT bulletins
publication is distributed which is
used to file notices of immediate
interest but short duration, such as
appointments, promotions, moves,
organizational changes, etc. These
are usually rescinded after one
year.
Documents in the Policy Guide
are organized basically by func
tional subject with required subcategories for each subject. In some
instances, documents are organized
by geographic area as noted below.
A list of the functional subjects
and a brief statement of their con
tent follows:
• General—This section includes
policies and standard practices that
have a broad application to more
than one functional activity and in
volve either the whole corporation
or several major groups or geo
graphic areas. Examples are unit
Management Adviser

... operations and routes that they literally got in each other's way.

reports required by World Head
quarters, travel authorizations, and
the corporate records retention pro
gram.
• Finance—Includes broad finan
cial procedures involving all areas
of financial administration.
Included are procedures involv
ing the Comptroller’s area such as
general accounting, payroll and
benefits accounting, auditing, data
processing, financial and account
ing methods and systems, financial
reports and analyses, and delega
tions of authority for capital ex
penditure acquisition.
More detailed financial material
is distributed in the separate Fi
nance and Treasurers Manual,
Comptroller's Manual, Manufactur
ing Cost Manual, Timekeeping
Guide, and Internal Audit Manual.
• .Legal and Corporate—Consists
of general legal procedures dealing
with corporate-wide compliance
with Government regulations in
volving antitrust laws, SEC regula
tions, use of outside counsel, legal
review of contracts, patents, taxes,
and directors’ selection and pay
ment.
• Public Relations
• Research, Development, and
Engineering—The RD&E section
standardizes the technical approach
for research, development, and en
gineering. Detailed procedures and
reporting requirements are included
in a separate RD&E Guide.
• Marketing—Includes market
ing planning, product advertising,
sales promotion, marketing reports,
sales methods, customer relations,
product evaluation and planning.
• Manufacturing—Includes in
dustrial engineering, manufactur
January-February, 1973

ing planning, facilities planning,
purchasing, supply, production
planning and control, and surplus
manufacturing equipment. Sepa
rate “Purchasing” and “Make-Buy”
manuals are also in use.
• Planning and Organization —
Concerns organization, business
planning and forecasting, man
power planning and control, sys
tems and procedures, management
controls, and control of consulting
services.
• Headquarters Administration
—Consists of material applicable to
corporate headquarters concerning
a variety of administrative subjects
basically limited in scope to ITT
World Headquarters in New York
City. Distribution of documents in
cluded in this section is generally
limited to manual holders only at
Headquarters.

• Real Estate—Includes proce
dures that establish a control over
the purchase, sale, or lease of real
estate.
• Quality—Sets forth procedures
for the establishment and operation
of quality control functions and re
porting at applicable units.
The remaining sections are for
policies and standard practices ap
plicable to specific areas or man
agement groups as follows:

North America
Europe
Latin America
Far East and Pacific
International Communications
Operations—Worldwide

Each policy and standard prac
tice includes a “Reference” section
with cross references to other pro-

One foreign executive, trying to describe a situation new to his experience,
used the exact reverse of an English phrase in the lexicon and came up
with an English expression better suited to a farm than a business concern.
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ITT'S FAMILY OF MANUALS

OTHER CORPORATE MANUALS
COMPTROLLER'S
•
COMPTROLLER'S MANUAL
•
MANUAL OF ACCOUNTS
•
COST MANUAL
LEGAL
•
ITT DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
(CORPORATE SECRETARY)

MARKETING
•
MARKETING GRID PROGRAM MANUAL
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Drafts of new policies are circu
lated to all executives responsible
for areas affected by the subject.
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cedures dealing with related topics.
This simplifies research when spe
cific information is sought to deter
mine company policy or practice.
For easy initial reference, subjects
are included in a table of contents
and an alphabetical index.
As to development of a policy
or standard practice, this is a highly
specialized procedure. Action may
result from such varied areas as the
follow-through of an approved rec
ommendation of a completed study,
a request for a required procedure
to cover a new subject, or a need
for a revision to an already pub
lished document. Any member of
management at World Headquart
ers or a unit in the field may re
quest issuance of a specific policy
or change to a published document.
It begins with a request to the Or
ganization Administration Depart
ment where it is reviewed, evalu
ated, and, if a valid subject for
coverage, developed into the best
format for the clearest and most
precise presentation. In many in
stances, a systems or procedural
study must be conducted to deter
mine what is the best or proper solu
tion to be presented in the policy.
In other instances, it is simply a
matter of writing up the details.
Preliminary drafts are reviewed
and discussed with executives who
are the most knowledgeable and
involved with the subject matter.
The draft is then circulated for re
view and comment to all executives
with responsibility for areas af
fected by subject of the proposed
document. This may involve as
many as 30 contacts.
Comments on the draft are re
viewed and a final document is de
veloped and sent to the executive
with responsibility for the area or
function affected by the document
for his approval signature. For ex
ample, a document dealing with a
legal subject would be sent to the
Director of the Legal Department
for approval signature or one deal
ing with a high-level corporate
wide activity would be submitted
to the President of the corporation
for his final review and approval
signature.
If there are significant divergent

opinions as to the proposed docu
ment’s content or application, Or
ganization Administration mediates
a decision, or, if this is not possible,
decides what action serves the best
interest of ITT and writes an opin
ion with sufficient background to
support the action taken in the final
version of the document.
Although coordination may cover
a wide variety of people, the proc
essing time span is short because of
constant follow-up.
The worldwide distribution for
documents to be inserted in the
over 1,500 outstanding ITT Policy
Guides is processed through the
use of computerized listings that
control the distribution of this
manual and all the other functional
manuals. When a name is changed
or taken off the list for one manual,
it is automatically changed or taken
off all the other listed distributions.
The computerized distribution is
updated weekly to reflect changes
in assignment of existing manuals
and for the addition of new manual
holders. The computerized distri
bution program also provides a
monthly schedule which lists all
manual holders and the various
manuals assigned to each person.
This listing is used for a variety of
purposes.
Documents to be distributed go
from the Reproduction Department
directly to the mailroom where
computer-produced mailing labels
are affixed to envelopes and the
material is inserted.
Lexicon often necessary

Obviously most aspiring organi
zations don’t need a system as elab
orate as the one I have outlined.
But they do need a system of some
kind. Even if all the personnel are
American, a lexicon is a wise thing
to prepare. All workers may share
a common language but a word or
a phrase may have entirely differ
ent meanings in New York City
and Columbus, Ohio. And at least
rudimentary versions of the policy
guides we use will keep all divi
sions of the newly formed company
working toward the same goals and
observing the same rules.
Management Adviser

RECOGNITION OF EDP
OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

(The following grid has been designed to aid businesses in identifying
operational difficulties in their EDP systems.)

Absence of the following techniques
leads to adverse results:

Adverse Results

High Purchasing Costs

Costly Reconstruction

X

Wastage of Supplies

X

Other Effects

Risk of Fraud or Vandalism

Multitude of Equipment

X

Down Time

Excess Usage Charges

X

Low Production

X

Peaks/Valleys

Idleness

Inaccuracies

X

Excessive Programming

X

X
X

Managerial Needs Unmet

Multitude of Projects

X

Limited Savings/Excessive Costs

Turnover

X

Delays

Idleness/Unnecessary Staff
X

Low Utilization

Effect on Equipment

Effect on Systems

Constant Overtime

Effect
on
Employees

Organization and Planning
Long-term master plan for systems development
Executive support for systems program
Organization charts and job descriptions
Assignment of responsibilities for:
Systems design
Programming —systems changes
Programming — maintenance
Programming — standards
Forms design
Design and development of coding systems
Keeping abreast of technological changes
Computer operations
Keypunching
Production planning and control
Library
Separation of duties—Analysts-Programmers/
Computer Operators
Authorizations and approval of program changes
Supervisory review of machine logs

X

X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Systems Analysis and Programming
Project controls relating to:
Project objectives
Project benefits
Project.costs
Testing and/or acceptance
Supervisory review and approval
Progress review
Post completion evaluation
Documentation of study and conclusions
Project priority assignments and backlog controls
Participation in projects by users
Participation of internal auditors:
Planning and development of project proposals
Pre-installation review emphasizing internal
controls
Review of project documentation
Review of test documentation (for adequacy and
control purposes)
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X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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RECOGNITION OF EDP OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
Absence of the following techniques
leads to adverse results:

Adverse Results

X

X

High Purchasing Costs

X
X
X

Costly Reconstruction

Risk of Fraud or Vandalism

X
X

Down Time

X
X

Wastage of Supplies

Multitude of Equipment

Peaks/Valleys________________

Excess Usage Charges

X

Low Production

X

Other Effects

Low Utilization

Excessive Programming

X

Effect on Equipment

Idleness

Managerial Needs Unmet_______

Inaccuracies ________________

________
Multitude of Projects

Limited Savings/Excessive Costs

Effect on Systems

Delays

Turnover

Constant Overtime

Idleness/Unnecessary Staff

Effect
on
Employees

Current Operations
Completeness/security of documentation for
existing applications:
Systems descriptions
Run manual, including source listing or deck
Operator instructions
Test data, current and available
Record of changes to programs
Use of programmed data controls where opportune
Use of multi-programming, as appropriate to
improve computer utilization
Use of outside services to level peak loads
Preventive maintenance, and use of related outside
services as appropriate
Scheduling of computer and of peripheral equipment
Planning and supervisory authorization of overtime
Consideration of high-speed input/output devices
Consideration of sectional core
Time and activity reporting system
Consideration of key-to-tape and/or key-to-disk
Consideration of source data automation
Preparation of periodic summary reports:
Computer utilization

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

Preventive maintenance
Down time

X

Rerun time

X

Production time

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

Time charges to users

X

Periodic review of equipment utilization
Periodic studies of equipment “balance”

X

X

Periodic study to consolidate or decentralize
data processing functions
Use of electronic switching, as appropriate in
a network of computers

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Security
File protection in terms of the storage
of copies in loss-proof vaults
File reconstruction capabilities
Restrictions on access to necessary personnel

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

x

X
X
X

Reprinted with permission from Lybrand Newsletter, September, 1972, Vol. XIV, No. 8, a publication of Lybrand, Ross Bros. &
Montgomery, New York.
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RECOGNITION OF EDP OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
Absence of the following techniques

leads to adverse results:

Adverse Results

X

High Purchasing Costs

Costly Reconstruction

Risk of Fraud or Vandalism

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

Other Effects

Wastage of Supplies

Multitude of Equipment

Down Time

Peaks/Valleys

Excess Usage Charges

Low Utilization

Low Production

______

Effect on Equipment

Idleness

Inaccuracies
Excessive Programming

Managerial Needs Unmet

Delays
Limited Savings/Excessive Costs

Effect on Systems

Multitude of Projects

Turnover

Idleness/Unnecessary Staff
Guards, lockable doors, and other protection
devices
Terminal and access codes
“Instant” terminations of data processing
employees
Emergency power backup
Emergency computer installation backup

Constant Overtime

Effect
on
Employees

X
X

Buying of Computer Resources
Observance of sound procurement practices relating to
specification of needs, shopping of market, preparation
of complete purchase orders, etc.
Evaluations of financial and performance capabilities
of potential vendors
Evaluation of vendor contracts by legal department,
as appropriate
Periodic lease or buy studies
Periodic studies of independent peripherals
versus main-frame manufacturer

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

Miscellaneous
Sale of waste paper and cards
Program for cleaning and testing and/or
replacing magnetic tape
Controls over computer time sold to outsiders

X
X

X

processing departments. According
chart, which ap
peared in the September issue
to Lybrand, Ross, each of the tech
of the Lybrand Newsletter, a publiniques has shown its effectiveness
within that firm’s own experience.
cation of Lybrand, Ross Bros. &
The CPA firm warns, however,
Montgomery, was intended to alert
that the chart should not be used
companies operating computers to
blindly; each of the techniques
the effect that various techniques—
listed should be used as a take-off
or rather the absence of various tech
point for thorough fact-finding and
niques—might have on the overall
evaluation procedures, if it is not
efficiency of their electronic data
he preceding

T
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X

X

X

already in use. The chart serves,
therefore, mainly as a checklist to
ensure that no necessary step has
been overlooked, since, as was
pointed out in the note in the
Newsletter, “rapid advances in
computer technology can result in
systems that are vulnerable to op
erational inefficiencies.”
—The Editors

57

what people are writing about

BOOKS
The High Priests of Waste by
A. Ernst Fitzgerald, W. W. Nor
ton & Company, Inc., New York,
1972, 416 pages, $8.95.

The industrial engineer who lost
his job in the Pentagon for expos
ing the failure of the Air Force’s
C-5A cargo plane project tells his
story—and presents a blistering in
dictment of the military-industrial
complex.
A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a manage
ment consultant with his own in
dustrial engineering firm specializ

ing in cost reduction, was appointed
Deputy for Management Systems
(reporting to the Assistant Secre
tary of the Air Force for Financial
Management) in 1965. It was a
time when Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara and his Whiz
Kids were promising to eliminate
the waste in and make some sense
out of the giant military procure
ment system. Four years and innu
merable futile cost reduction at
tempts later, Mr. Fitzgerald was
out of the Pentagon for telling an
investigating committee headed by
Sen. William Proxmire of Wiscon
sin that the cost of the C-5A cargo
plane was running $2 billion over
the original estimate.

Mr. Fitzgerald is, understand
ably, somewhat bitter over his ex
perience. And he thinks the public
should be, too, for it is the public’s
money that is being wasted in what
Mr. Fitzgerald pictures as a giant
boondoggle resulting from corrup
tion, ineptitude, and, he thinks,
deliberate policy.
There are only a few heroes in
Mr. Fitzgerald’s book, and of them
only Senator Proxmire is less ob
scure than Mr. Fitzgerald himself.
There are many villains—in the de
fense contracting companies, in the
armed services, in the Department
of Defense, even in a CPA firm—
and nearly all of them are identi
fied by name in this highly explo

REVIEW EDITORS
In order to assure comprehensive coverage of magazine
articles dealing with management subjects, Management
Adviser has arranged with fifteen universities offering the
Ph.D. degree in accounting to have leading magazines in
the field reviewed on a continuing basis by Ph.D. candi
dates under the guidance of the educators listed, who
serve as the review board for this department of Manage
ment Adviser. Unsigned reviews have been written by
members of the magazine’s staff.

Ernest I. Hanson, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Dale S. Harwood, Jr., University of Oregon, Eugene
Daniel Jensen, University of Illinois, Urbana
Walter B. Meigs, University of Southern California, Los

Jim G. Ashburne, The University of Texas, Austin
Thomas J. Burns, The Ohio State University, Columbus
Leonard A. Doyle, University of California, Berkeley
William Felix, University of Washington, Seattle

Michael Schiff, New York University, New York
Williard E. Stone, University of Virginia, Charlottesville
Milton F. Usry, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater
Rufus Wixon, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

Angeles
John H. Myers, Indiana University, Bloomington
Carl L. Nelson, Columbia University, New York
Hugo Nurnberg, Michigan State University, East Lansing
James W. Pattillo, Louisiana State University, Baton

Rouge
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sive book. (The only exceptions
are the consultants of McKinsey
and Co.—referred to throughout as
“the McKinseys”—whose Cost Man
agement Improvement Program Mr.
Fitzgerald saw as a device for per
petuating the old, unsound assump
tions about cost control in a vastly
more paper-intensive form.) A few
characters in the story, like McNa
mara himself; Defense Comptroller
Robert Anthony; and Dr. Leonard
Marks, Jr., Fitzgerald’s immediate
boss, play more ambiguous—al
though on the whole negativeroles in the drama.
Mr. Fitzgerald’s account of the
vicissitudes of such weapons devel
opment projects as the C-5A (which
ended in the famous Congressional
bail-out of Lockheed’s civilian and
military business), the F-111 fighter
plane, and the Minuteman missile
is fascinating. So are his criticisms
of the Whiz Kids’ management gim
micks; he has much that is inter
esting to say about PERT/Cost,
statistical analysis, cost and per
formance measurement, and fixed
price incentive contracting. As an
industrial engineer of the pre-man
agement-science school, Mr. Fitz
gerald has a bias in favor of more
traditional means of cost control.
Indeed, his Pentagon troubles be
gan when he opposed the McKin
seys’ plan to base cost estimating
on historical cost, “with the fat
built in.”
However, the problems in de
fense procurement, as Mr. Fitz
gerald makes clear, are more funda
mental than technical. They trans
cend individuals and parties: “Many
of the cost-control advocates in the
Pentagon . . . believed that things
would change with the advent of
the new Administration on January
20 and the departure of the old,
sick, and frightened Democratic
leadership. Things did change. They
got worse.”
The basic problem lies in in
grained attitudes. Mr. Fitzgerald
hits hard at such attitudes as the
“Ape Theory of Engineering” (“. . .
if enough chimpanzees could be
put to work at enough typewriters,
one of them would eventually re
produce the works of Shakespeare.
January-February, 1973

. . . One manager of a contractor
missile project told me he never
worried about engineering prob
lems. ‘I just assign a thousand or
so guys to the problem . . . One of
them is bound to come up with
a solution.’”); “cost Calvinism,”
which holds that ultimate costs of
big weapons systems are preor
dained; the assumption that esti
mated costs will always be exceeded
because of “Inexorable Economic
Processes”; and the belief that it is
futile to try to predict costs when
operating on the “Frontiers of Man’s
Knowledge.”
Not only is cost control in mili
tary procurement assumed to be
impossible, it is even held to be
undesirable. Many in the Pentagon
sincerely believe, according to Mr.
Fitzgerald, that the national econ
omy depends on the maintenance
of defense spending and that waste
is unimportant since the money
spent goes to maintain jobs and
promote the nation’s economic wel
fare.
Many defense contractors have
come to believe that their corporate
survival is essential to national sur
vival and that they have a right
to subsidize their civilian business
with the fat from military contracts.
These views are widely shared by
military contract supervisors who
expect to move to jobs in the com
panies they have negotiated with
when they retire.
“Inefficiency is national policy,”
said Air Force Major General
“Zeke” Zoeckler in one of the most
famous quotations in the Fitzgerald
book. He said in a speech to an
Air Force cost study team that in
efficiency in the operations of mili
tary contractors was necessary to
the attainment of “social goals,”
such as equal employment oppor
tunity programs, seniority clauses
in union agreements, programs for
employment of the handicapped,
apprentice programs, aid to small
business, aid to distressed labor
areas, and encouragement of im
provements in plant layouts and
facilities.
The outcome of all this, Mr.
Fitzgerald believes, has been not
only waste of the taxpayers’ money

and a weakened defense posture
(since many weapons have proved
unsatisfactory as well as costly)
but a loss of American industrial
competitiveness on the world mar
ket as indifference to costs has
spread from military to civilian
business. The solution? Here, like
most writers on this subject, Mr.
Fitzgerald falls down. The only
thing he can suggest is progressive
reduction of the defense budget, in
the hope that necessity will prove
to be the mother of invention in
the defense establishment.
Even without panaceas, this is
an important book. Perhaps it does
contain “considerable innuendo and
outright fabrication,” as former
Deputy Secretary of Defense David
Packard charged in a review of
the book for Business Week (com
pared by one reader of that maga
zine to a review of the Crucifixion
by Pontius Pilate). But if even a
fraction of Mr. Fitzgerald’s charges
are true, it is time the taxpayers—
with the help of the accounting and
consulting fraternities—did some
thing about it.

Profile for Profitability: Using
Cost Control and Profitability
Analysis by Thomas S. Dudick,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York,
1972, 263 pages, $12.95.

Less broad than its ambitious
title suggests, this book is really a
collection of articles and case stud
ies on various applications of cost
accounting. Its lack of a unifying
idea is more than redeemed by its
intensely practical orientation.
This is, its author says, “a book
on profitability ... a broad review
of the various aspects of profitabil
ity rather than a narrow treatment
slanted toward financial manage
ment.”
Actually, it is not. One might,
indeed, question whether it is a
book at all, for it has no consistent
message, no overall theme, no logi
cal thought progression. It is, rather,
a collection of thoughts drawn
somewhat randomly from a lifetime
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of experience in industrial cost
accounting—loosely connected by
transitional paragraphs here and
there.
What Mr. Dudick has done is
to assemble a group of his articles
(some of which originally appeared
in this magazine), weave in some
additional interpretation, and call
it a book.
The first section of the volume is
the most cohesive. A group of arti
cles on indicators of profitability
deal with the general use of finan
cial ratios to compare one com
pany’s financial position with that
of another, the use of three major
indicators of productivity, and the
planning of orderly growth through
the application of “ten command
ments for expansion.” A lively case
study, in play script form, demon
strates how a group of executives
might analyze how their company
is doing—and why.
The second section, on assuring
profitability, is more diffuse. It con
tains articles on profit planning,
flexible budgeting, job costing, con
trol of the costs of raw materials
and direct labor, evaluating the
profitability of a new venture, im
proving the utilization of inven
tories and facilities, and one way
of taking the economic outlook into
account in planning.
The third section, titled “Impor
tance of Meaningful Feedback,”
covers such subjects as improving
return on investment, analysis of
cost flow and product profitability,
formats of financial statements, var
iance analysis, and direct vs. ab
sorption costing.
Throughout the book the writing
is vivid and lively, and there is
abundant use of graphs, charts,
sample financial reports, and case
study and anecdotal material.
Identifying this volume as a
glorified anthology should not lead
the reader to infer that it is not
worth reading. For, just as Mr.
Dudick is incapable of generaliza
tion in the broadest sense, so is he
incapable of generalities. His writ
ing has a concreteness, a specifi
city, an immediacy that is virtually
unique among writers on account
ing subjects. Each one of his little
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case studies is real, alive, and in
stantly comprehensible.
Equally for the manager who is
confused by the jargon of his com
pany’s accountants and for the ac
countant who has yet to learn how
to bring his abstractions down to
the plant level, this is an invaluable
little work. Anyone who has a
problem related to any of its topics
cannot fail to be helped by it.

The Marketing of Professional
Services by Aubrey Wilson, Mc

Graw-Hill Book Company, New
York, 1972, 193 pages, $12.50.
Less useful than it might have
been if the author had written it
out of his head rather than as a
treatise on marketing theory, this
book is still a valuable aid to the
professional in any field.
As every professional knows, ser
vices do not sell themselves. Not
even the best-known and longestestablished accounting, consulting,
or other professional service firm
can expect the magic of its name to
bring in enough business over the
transom to support a growing staff
or meet the increasing competition
of less squeamish rivals.
Yet, as this author points out,
little has been written about the
marketing of professional services
outside the service firms’ own man
uals.
Expertise in this field is closely
guarded and often regarded as a
necessary evil whose practice is
beneath the dignity of the true
professional.
Thus, there is a real need for a
practical book on this subject, and
the author of this volume, the man
aging director of a British mar
keting research firm, might seem
to be the ideal choice to supply it.
He has the dual credentials of pro
fessional practitioner and market
ing specialist.
After defining a professional ser
vice (“A professional service is one
purchased by industry and institu
tions from individuals and organi

zations, and is designed to improve
the purchasing organization’s per
formance or well-being and to re
duce uncertainty by the application
of skills derived from a formal and
recognized body of knowledge,
which may be interdisciplinary,
and which provides criteria for the
assessment of the results of the
application of the service”) and
analyzing the main differences be
tween its marketing and that of
goods and products, the author ap
proaches the subject from the buy
er’s point of view.
He tells how to outline the im
portant facts about the buying pro
cess: who in a company buys pro
fessional services, how the buying
process is initiated, and why a
buyer will decide to purchase a
particular service from a particular
firm or individual. Then he tells
how to use this information to
develop a marketing strategy, how
to identify and develop sales op
portunities, and how to negotiate
specific contracts. Mr. Wilson puts
much stress on self-analysis, par
ticularly how the professional can
identify the special niche he can
fill in the customer’s planning. All
this is told simply and clearly, if
somewhat dryly, with little use of
anecdotes.
Clearly, there is much in this
book that is valuable. Unfortun
ately Mr. Wilson has chosen to
think of it as a contribution to mar
keting theory rather than a guide to
action, and both his basic organiza
tion structure and his specific pre
cepts are weakened by being fitted
into that framework. Essentially,
he has adapted a book about the
marketing concept to the marketing
of services rather than simply at
tacking the practical questions in
volved head-on on the basis of his
own experience. This forces the
reader to probe harder than he
really should have to in order to
get answers to his questions—but
most of them are there if he tries.
This could have been a better
book, but, in the relative absence
of competition, it remains a must
for the accountant or consultant
who wants to build his business.
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Breakthrough:
Women
into
Management by Rosaline Loring
and Theodora Wells, Van No
strand Reinhold Company, New
York, 1972, 202 pages, $7.95.

Two woman personnel profes
sionals have combined a demand
that women be given more oppor
tunity in management with a man
ual on how to do it.

“Affirmative action programs”
with specific goals and timetables
for more equal opportunities in
management employment for wom
en as well as minorities are now
required of all Federal contractors
under Executive Order 11246 (Re
vised Order No. 4). This require
ment affects approximately onethird of the work force. Further
more, a growing number of law
suits are being filed under the
Equal Federal Pay Act of 1963 and
Title VII of the Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (extended to
managers and professionals in 1972),
forbidding discrimination by private
employers of 25 or more, labor or
ganizations, employment agencies,
and union-management apprentice
ship programs.
This new legal status for work
ing women is what gives this book
its somewhat peremptory tone. Un
like other books on women man
agers in the past, it is not a plea
that women be given more nearly
equal opportunities; it is a demand.
Although it contains all the old,
familiar arguments and answers to
male objections, they are presented
in an almost offhand way—for now
there is a legal whip behind them.
Able for the first time to be prac
tical rather than propagandistic,
the authors explain what an “af
firmative action program” is and
how to develop one. Their presen
tation is weakened by the absence
of case study material, but that is
hardly their fault; it is part of the
burden of pioneering. Illustrative
examples will become more readily
available as the Federal enforce
ment process moves ahead.
Meanwhile, present and prospec
tive Federal contractors had better
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get busy. This book is not the per
fect solution to their problem—for
example, its information on recruit
ing and sources of supply of women
executives is skimpy—but it is the
only one available so far, and it
will have to do.

Where Have All the Robots
Gone? Worker Dissatisfaction in
the ’70’s by Harold L. Sheppard

and Neal Q. Herrick, The Free
Press, a Division of The Macmillan
Company, New York, 1972, 222
pages, $7.95.

These authors claim, on the basis
of rather slim statistical evidence,
that worker dissatisfaction is wide
spread in American industry.

More and more workers, those
authors declare, “are becoming dis
enchanted with the boring, repeti
tive tasks set by a merciless assem
bly line or by bureaucracy. They
feel they have been herded into
economic and social cul-de-sacs."
This is, the authors feel, a serious
problem for American industry, par
ticularly with the growing number
of workers under 30, who are “more
dissatisfied, more oriented toward
change, and have higher expecta
tions of work than their older coun
terparts.”
To back up these assertions, the
authors quote in great detail the
results of three surveys. One, a
national survey of a national prob
ability sample of 1,533 employed
workers conducted by the Survey
Research Center of the University
of Michigan for the U. S. Depart
ment of Labor in 1969, found that
13 per cent were dissatisfied with
their jobs and only 63 per cent con
sidered their jobs to be like the
kinds they had originally wanted.
The other two surveys were con
ducted by the authors themselves
on behalf of the W. E. Upjohn In
stitute for Employment Research,
where they both work. One cov
ered 101 members of the auto and
steel workers’ unions in Kalamazoo,
Mich., in 1971; the other, 270 un
described blue-collar workers in

Pennsylvania in 1970. In these two
surveys 22 per cent of the workers
were found to be dissatisfied with
their jobs and only 37 per cent said
the jobs they held were like the
ones they had originally aimed at.
(Incidentally, although the an
swers to each survey question are
discussed intensively, with piles
of percentages and footnotes, no
where are the surveys themselves
described. Their salient character
istics have to be pieced together
from scattered references.)
On this rather slight evidence
the authors have constructed a
book-length analysis of what may
well be a major problem: Workers
are less happy with their jobs than
they have ever been (although
there is no real comparative evi
dence about how happy they used
to be). The discontent is rooted
in the nature of the work rather
than in such side issues as pay and
working conditions. This discontent
is leading workers into all sorts of
undesirable behavior, i.e., absentee
ism, and inattention to quality.
Actually, whatever one may think
of the authors’ work as a serious
contribution to sociology, they may
well be right. They are not the first
to say it, after all. The problem is
one that deserves further study—
and more effort on management’s
part than is indicated by the rather
cursory round-up of a few job en
largement plans that the book pre
sents. Oversensationalized though
it is, this book probably contains
a nugget of truth—and a signal to
more research.

Segment Reporting for Managers
and Investors by Alfred Rappa

and Eugene M. Lerner, Na
tional Association of Accountants,
New York, 1972, 99 pages, $10 ($6
to NAA members).

port

Assuming that public reporting
by line of business will become
more widespread in the coming
years, these authors attempt to de
velop a model that will permit use
of the same data base to serve the
needs of both public disclosure
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and management reporting, despite
differences in the information re
quirements of the two audiences.

Segment reporting is desired by
many investors and lenders as a
guide to sound decisions about
companies whose component ac
tivities differ in terms of growth,
profitability, and risk. In 1969, in
a previous NAA study, these au
thors concluded that such report
ing was desirable. In this report
they explore its implementation.
First they explain how to divide
the corporate entity into basic ac
tivities, offering guidelines for the
choice of activities on which to
report. Then they propose models
for segregated activity earnings
and funds statements that meet the
investor’s basic needs and indicate
how these models can serve as the
framework of a management plan
ning and control system.
A chapter on specific accounting
problems in segment reporting uses
Tenneco Inc. as a prototype for
analysis. The final chapter, based
on a critical examination of 1969
and 1970 annual reports of 147
diversified companies, deals with
voluntary disclosure practices.
Although somewhat academic in
approach and concise in style to
the point where it is sometimes
difficult to read, this is a useful
book for financial executives and
auditors faced with the decision
about or the reality of segment re
porting.
Briefly listed
Social Measurement: Points of
View of Sociologists, Business
men, Political Scientists, Govern
ment Officials, Economists, and
CPAs, American Institute of Certi

fied Public Accountants, New York,
1972, 123 pages, $5 to nonmembers,
$4 to members, and $3 to educators
(paperbound).

This booklet is the transcript of
a symposium conducted by the
AICPA on the subject of the ap
plication of accounting measure
ment techniques to the social sec
tor. Kinds of social measurement
62

being done or considered by the
other professional groups repre
sented at the meeting were also
considered.

MAGAZINES
The Do’s and Don’ts of Manage
ment Advisory Services by John
R. Mitchell, The CPA Journal,
October, 1972.

A comprehensive and workman
like guide to the organization and
staffing of an MAS department
within a CPA firm, Mr. Mitchell’s
article will be particularly valuable
to the accounting firm that is get
ting into a formal, autonomous
MAS operation for the first time.
The author, who has organized
his article into 14 points or guide
lines, each of which he discusses
briefly, has covered a broad field
surprisingly well. Starting out with
the basic raison d’etre of an MAS
department and selection of the
necessary personnel, he arrives very
quickly at such mundane but im
portant subjects as frequency of
billing and implementation of the
consultants’ recommendations.
Mr. Mitchell points out that the
CPA firms that have been most suc
cessful in satisfying both their cli
ents and themselves in the consult
ing area have organized their MAS
activities and structure into an au
tonomous organization closely re
sembling a nonaccounting consult
ing firm. This is no accident, he as
serts; rather it stems from the ac
tual economic and professional re
quirements of consulting practice.
The author’s 14 exhortations,
around which the article is built,
are:

• Be honest about your capabil
ities, with your client and yourself.
• Start your MAS operation with
experienced consultants.
• Develop and use competent
outside resources to supplement
your own capabilities.
• Concentrate on engagements
which are economically viable.
• Establish specific responsibil
ity for each engagement.

• Don’t try to solve the client’s
problem in your first conversation.
• Be specific about the objec
tives, approach, and costs of each
engagement.
• Clearly designate the respon
sibility for implementation of rec
ommendations.
• Plan and schedule each en
gagement.
• Emphasize specific recommen
dations and fundamental improve
ments.
• Let the client know when the
engagement is completed.
• Bill your services specifically
and promptly.
• Keep all professional personnel
alert for MAS opportunities.
• Organize your MAS activities
as a profit center.
Mr. Mitchell’s well-organized
and developed presentation betrays
his own background as a manage
ment consultant (he is now direc
tor of the Management Advisory
Services Division of the AICPA).
It is logical; it is clear; and it sticks
to its point: the organization and
mechanics of establishing an MAS
department.
As a map, a sort of table of or
ganization for creation of such a
department, it is excellent. The
only qualities the reader must sup
ply are the talent, the background,
and the instinct to make MAS work.

A Linear Risk Constraint in
Capital Budgeting by C. Whit
more and S. Darkazanli, Manage

ment Science (Application Series),
December, 1971.
Since many companies now em
ploy mathematical programing in
capital budgeting, it is implied that
some recognition of uncertainty or
risk is desirable in undertaking the
capital budgeting decision process.
Two methods for constructing linear
restrictions to approximate risk con
straints in capital budgeting are
presented.

One of these models is discussed.
The uncertainty associated with
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each project being considered is
represented by its mean present
value, the variance of its present
value, and, either its covariance
with the firm’s current operations
or its responsiveness to an index
of general economic activity. That
is, cash flows are regarded as ran
dom variables. Where realistic esti
mates of future cash flows have
been made, and present values
have been computed, without con
sidering the problem of uncertainty,
it does not seem unreasonable to
accept resulting present values as
the mean present values. The vari
ance of the present value of each
project can be built up from the
variance of each cash flow and
making use of the following —
n

Variance (∑ Ki Xi) =
1=1

n

Ki2 variance Xi
∑
1=1
n

n

+ 2∑∑KiKj
i<j

covariance (Xi Xj)
where the Ki are real constants and
the Xi random variables. In deter
mining the variance of the present
value of a project Ki = (1 + r)-n
where r is
the discount rate
and n is the number of periods
over which the particular cash flow
Xi is being discounted.
The capital budgeting problem

The investment decision is view
ed as a task of selecting a port
folio of capital projects. The prob
lem is stated as,

max (μ)
subject to,

(1)
σ2 ≤ V
where
n

μ = ∑μj Xj and
j=1
n

n

i=l j=l

covariance (pi pj) Xi Xj

where μj is the mean present value
of project j,
pj is the present value of
project j, a random variable
Xj is the extent of accept
ance of project j
Xj ϵ [0,1]
That is, the mean value of the
portfolio is maximized, subject to
a constraint on its uncertainty.
The problem selects optimal Xj.
If fractional solutions for Xj are not
meaningful, that is, a project is
either to be accepted or rejected,
then the problem becomes more
difficult to solve. More importantly,
to the authors, the variance con
straint introduces nonlinearity in
the X’s. Their contribution is in
suggesting a linearization of this
constraint.
Their argument proceeds as fol
lows (emphasis added):
It is well known, although rarely
stated explicitly that the present
value of cash flows from current
operations of the firm should be
included. . . . Most firms have a
large number of ongoing pro
grams and operations which are
not considered in the capital
budgeting decision. Although the
ory suggests that each current
project should be revaluated in
each budget period, this is not
done in practice. Usually only
new investment opportunities and
a few current projects earmarked
for reconsideration are subjected
to the analysis. . . . Given this,
it seems reasonable to designate
one project . . . say project #1,
to represent all current opera
tions of the firm, that is, all in
vestments implemented sometime
in the past but not presently be
ing re-evaluated. Since current
operations will be continued
X1 = 1 in the capital budgeting
problem.

The variance constraint is rewritten
as follows,
n

variance pi + 2∑ Xj

= ∑ X2i
i=1

n n

variance pi + 2∑∑ Xi Xj
i<j

covariance (pi pj)
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covariance (pi, pj)

+ ∑ ∑ Xi Xj
i=2 j=2

covariance (pi pj) ≤ V
The authors go on to claim that
for many firms the capital budget
in any year represents a small frac
tion of the value of the firm’s total
assets. Further, they claim that
many of the new investment proj
ects under consideration have pres
ent values which are highly posi
tively correlated with the present
value of current operations. That is,
the new projects will tend to per
form well when existing invest
ments do well and perform badly
when the existing portfolio of proj
ects performs adversely. The au
thors argue that it is this fact that
affects the uncertainty of new port
folios most significantly; in their
words:

This covariance of project present
values with the present value of
current operations usually con
tributes significantly more to the
total risk of the firm than the
risk of any combination of the
capital investments projects be
ing considered.

They therefore drop the last term
from the rewritten variance con
straint above leaving a linear con
straint in the X’s. The authors claim
that the analysis required to deter
mine the covariance of a project
with the firm’s current operations
“is not unlike the reasoning busi
ness managers use every day in
relating one aspect of their busi
ness to another.”

Evaluation

The practitioner advising his
client on capital expenditure deci
sions and using linear programing
techniques will have to evaluate
the tradeoff involved between a
linear constraint and a more com
plete nonlinear uncertainty state
ment.
The authors point out that the
number of parameters to be es
timated is of order n (the num
ber of projects being considered)
in the simplified model and of or
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der n2 in the complete model.
Specifically, there are (n2 ÷ n)/2
statistical parameters to be esti
mated in the complete variance
constraint, and n in the simpler
model. If the number of projects
being considered is not so large as
to make the difference significant
then one advantage of the sug
gested approach is minimized. The
advantage of linearity remains and
is difficult to evaluate since the real
advantage depends on the ability of
the practitioner to use nonlinear
programing techniques. The term
(Xi2 variance pi) could be added
— this still leaves out the covari
ances between the projects—and
the constraint remains convex even
though nonlinear.
Highlight uncertainty in
budgeting

Perhaps the main contribution of
the authors is that they bring atten
tion to the uncertainty involved
in capital budgeting decisions.
Whereas this is not novel, it can
not be overemphasized. The authors
make use of earlier developments
in portfolio theory.
J. K. Winsen
The Ohio State University
The Relationship Between Bene
fit-Cost Analysis and PlanningProgramming - Budgeting - Sys
tems by N. W. Fisher, The Aus
tralian Accountant, April, 1972.

Although benefit-cost analysis
and planning-programing-budget
ing systems are usually treated as
separate approaches to the gov
ernment decision-making process,
Fisher points out their similarities
and the possibility of applying ben
efit-cost analysis as a part of the
PPBS approach.

Benefit-cost analysis may be de
fined as the application of quanti
tative economic analysis to public
investment decisions. Basically, the
approach involves the valuation of
the benefits to be derived from an
investment over an extended time
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period, the use of compound inter
est techniques to discount these
values, and the comparison of the
projects being considered. The im
plied objective of economic effi
ciency leads to selection criteria
which favor projects with the great
est excess of discounted benefits
over costs. Its corollary in private
industry is the general area of cap
ital budgeting.
Key characteristics of PPBS

Mr. Fisher defines and analyzes
planning - programing - budgeting
systems in terms of their key char
acteristics which are: 1) specifica
tion of program objectives; 2) pro
gram output analysis; 3) a multi
period approach to program costs
and benefits; 4) development of al
ternatives; and 5) evaluation of
program performance in terms of
the specified objectives.
While economic efficiency is the
implicit goal of benefit-cost anal
ysis, PPBS can embrace social, eco
nomic, political, or other goals. Al
though basic goals may be quali
tative in nature, they must be
clearly and precisely defined so that
input costs such as salaries may be
classified by objectives in the ac
counting-budgeting system. After
the careful specification of goals,
each proposed program is analyzed.
Fisher points out that benefit-cost
analysis can fit into the PPBS
framework at this point if the pro
gram output can be quantified and
valued. Otherwise, analytical tech
niques such as cost-effectiveness
(minimizing the cost of achieving
an effect or maximizing an effect
for a given cost) or qualitative rat
ing procedures may be used. Con
currently, alternative methods of
achieving goals are formulated and
analyzed.
Mathematical programing tech
niques are then used for project
selection and funding. The use of
mathematical programing requires
that outputs or goal achievements
be quantified in terms of measur
able units. In addition, these units
must be valued with respect to each
other (i.e., one unit of Project A

output is worth two units of Project
B output) to allow trading-off be
tween competing objectives. Once
such an objective function and re
lated constraints are agreed upon,
mathematical programing processes
of maximizing or minimizing an ob
jective function subject to con
straints may be used to determine
resource allocations to projects.
Fisher points out that PPBS allows
legislators to establish a program
structure as a basis for project se
lection and funding instead of con
sidering each project separately.
Furthermore, the long run nature
of the process forces legislators to
consider the objectives of projects
in their entirety as opposed to oneyear, input-oriented budgets which
allow “foot-in-the-door” project ap
proval.
Meaningful recording rare

The specification of units and
measurement methods which are
closely related to the basic objec
tives of projects also facilitates fol
low-up evaluations of programs. As
Fisher points out, meaningful quan
titative recording and reporting on
program achievements is rare. It is
all too easy to revert to measuring
effectiveness in terms of expendi
ture. Such circular reasoning could
lead to greater expenditures to in
crease measured effectiveness even
though the program is not achieving
its intended goals. Measuring the
output in the units used in the
mathematical programing enables
legislators to revise the relation
ships in the program structure
based on past performance.
The planning-programing-bud
geting system is a very comprehen
sive approach to government deci
sion making. Because of its longrun nature and required quantifica
tion of benefits, it can encompass
the more narrow techniques of
benefit-cost analysis. Hopefully,
the two approaches together will
lead to improved government deci
sion making.
William T. Harris, Jr.
Louisiana State University
at Baton Rouge
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